B v B: High Court declines marital status declaration where customary Cameroonian marriage gives rise to void marriage under English law

The husband's application under section 55 of the Family Law Act 1986 for a declaration that his marriage did not subsist has been dismissed, with the court finding that whilst the parties' 2008 customary marriage ceremony in Cameroon did not create a legally recognised marriage under Cameroonian law, it nonetheless gave rise to a void marriage under English law. That conclusion triggered the prohibition in section 58(5) of the 1986 Act, which prevents the court from making a declaration that a marriage was void ab initio.

The factual background was, in the deputy judge's own assessment, one of considerable dispute. The husband contended that the parties had married in a tribal customary ceremony in January 2003 and that the marriage had subsequently been dissolved by a further customary ceremony in September 2022. The wife's account differed entirely: she maintained that the parties had not met until 2007, that the marriage had been effected by a customary ceremony in Village B, Cameroon in September 2008, and that no divorce ceremony had ever taken place.

Both parties hold dual British and Cameroonian nationality. The wife accepted that she had been living in the UK under the name LYB, a name she had assumed on arrival in 2008, rather than her true given name. Her explanation was that false documentation had been required to align her entry to the UK with the account the husband had given to UK immigration authorities when he claimed asylum in 2006. The deputy judge accepted that account, finding that both parties had been knowing participants in misleading the UK authorities.

Mr Rees found the husband's version of events "wholly unbelievable and untrue," identifying a series of implausibilities in his account, including the alleged existence of a daughter, RB, for whom no contemporaneous evidence of any kind was produced, and a notable inconsistency between the husband's oral evidence and his subsequent submissions after consulting his McKenzie Friend. The husband's case had been materially shaped by the McKenzie Friend throughout the proceedings, and the deputy judge noted he had issued repeated warnings about the McKenzie Friend's conduct in court.

Central to the legal analysis was the expert evidence of Ms Josepha Sulem-Yong, a Cameroonian lawyer appointed as the single joint expert. She confirmed that under Cameroonian law, a customary marriage ceremony does not of itself create a legally valid marriage. Civil recognition requires either the court declaration procedure under the 1981 Ordinance or, following legislative reform, registration under Law No 2024/016. Because neither step had been taken, the parties' 2008 ceremony produced no legal marriage under Cameroonian law.

Applying the principles set out by Mostyn J in Tousi v Gaydukova [2023] EWHC 404 (Fam) and Moylan J in Assad v Kurter [2014] 2 FLR 833, the deputy judge held that the ceremony fell into the category of a marriage defective for want of formality but capable of later ratification. Under English private international law, that rendered it a void marriage rather than a non-qualifying ceremony. Accordingly, the court made no order on the application, whilst observing that either party would be entitled to apply for a nullity order.

The deputy judge also directed that an unredacted copy of the judgement be sent to the Secretary of State, having found that both parties had made false representations to UK immigration authorities. The wife had not opposed that course.

The case is a reminder of the difficulties courts face when assessing the status of overseas customary marriages, particularly where the lex loci celebrationis draws a distinction between ceremonial and civil validity. The interaction between that distinction and section 58(5) of the 1986 Act effectively forecloses the declaration route, leaving nullity as the only available remedy.

B v B (Declaration as to Marital Status) [2026] EWHC 1317 (Fam). Both parties appeared as litigants in person.