Aksahin v London Borough of Enfield: passengers, car cruising injunctions and contempt of court

A passenger in a car cruising vehicle can be found in contempt of court even where they claim to have discouraged the driver, and good service of an injunction against persons unknown is sufficient to fix a defendant with knowledge of its terms.
The Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal against findings of contempt arising from a car cruising injunction obtained by the London Borough of Enfield. The judgement, handed down by Lord Justice Peter Jackson (with whom Lord Justices Cobb and Miles agreed), addresses the circumstances in which a passenger may be liable for breach of such an injunction and clarifies the relationship between service, knowledge, and culpability.
On 18 May 2025, Muhammad Aksahin was personally served with a warning under s.59 of the Police Reform Act 2002 after being found doing donuts at Enfield Retail Park, an area displaying prominent notices of a High Court injunction prohibiting car cruising throughout the borough. Five days later, at 00.45, he was a passenger in a BMW driven by Alin Hussein that was found racing at speed in the Clay Hill area of Enfield. Both men were arrested. At the committal hearing before Mr Richard Kimblin KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, Hussein admitted the breach; Aksahin contested it, arguing he had told Hussein to stop and that, as a mere passenger, he bore no liability. The judge found Aksahin in breach to the criminal standard and imposed a suspended sentence of 14 days' imprisonment (against 25 days for Hussein), with costs of £5,170.50 payable at £100 per month.
Participation by passengers
The Court rejected the submission that passive presence is insufficient to establish a breach. Lord Justice Peter Jackson observed that the mere presence of one car cruiser as a passenger in another car cruiser's car constitutes strong evidence of participation, since by its nature it encourages the showing-off that lies at the heart of car cruising. The appellant had offered no explanation at trial for why he was being driven around Enfield after midnight, so soon after his own s.59 warning in the same area. The trial judge had been entitled to draw the inference he did.
Knowledge and service
Aksahin maintained he was unaware of the injunction. The Court upheld two distinct bases for rejecting that contention. First, the judge had been entitled, as a primary finding of fact, to conclude that Aksahin actually knew of the order: he had been personally served with a s.59 warning whilst standing at the very retail park where some 20 notices were on prominent display, each stating that no car cruising was permitted within the borough and referring expressly to an injunction with a power of arrest. Second, and more broadly, applying Elliott Cuciurean v Secretary of State for Transport [2021] EWCA Civ 357 and Wolverhampton City Council v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 2273 (KB), where an injunction against persons unknown has been served in accordance with its terms, a defendant cannot resist committal on the ground of ignorance of its existence. Actual knowledge remains relevant to sanction, but not to liability.
Weight of the s.59 notice
Ground 4 argued that the s.59 warning, being administrative rather than a judicial finding, had been accorded improper weight. The Court disagreed. The notice was directly relevant to knowledge, participation, and sanction alike, and properly illuminated the appellant's credibility. There is nothing objectionable in a committal judge taking account of such a warning when considering whether a defendant knew of an injunction and whether his account of events is credible.
Sanction and costs
The suspended sentence had lapsed by the time of the appeal, the committal period of suspension having expired some six months earlier — a consequence of the appellant's delay in filing the necessary papers. The Court nonetheless confirmed the sanction had been appropriate and properly differentiated between driver and passenger. On costs, the judge had a wide discretion and was entitled to impose joint and several liability to maximise the prospect of the local authority recovering its outlay. Neither the appellant's financial position nor his passenger status required a different approach, though the instalment order reflected some consideration of his means. Notably, the Court confirmed that costs protection under s.26 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 does not extend to assisted parties in contempt proceedings: Secretary of State for Transport v Cuciurean [2022] EWCA Civ 661.
The Court added a pointed warning: any future breach of this or a similar injunction would be unlikely to result in a suspended term.
