Williams v FCDO: tribunal orders disclosure of Cameron-Xi briefing notes

Section 36 exemption fails where chilling effect arguments lack specificity
A First-tier Tribunal has allowed an appeal against the Information Commissioner's decision notice in Edward Williams v The Information Commissioner & The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office [2026] UKFTT 308 (GRC), ordering the FCDO to disclose portions of a briefing pack prepared for then Prime Minister David Cameron ahead of his December 2013 visit to China, including his meeting with President Xi Jinping.
The FCDO had withheld the material under sections 27, 35, 36 and 40 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. By the time of the proceedings, reliance on section 35 had been abandoned in favour of section 36, alongside continued reliance on sections 27 and 40. The tribunal's substituted decision notice upheld the section 27 exemption for certain passages, accepted section 40 in respect of personal data, but rejected the FCDO's section 36 arguments — finding the qualified person's opinion unreasonable.
Section 27: international relations exemption upheld
The tribunal accepted evidence from Dan Chugg, Director for North East Asia and China at the FCDO, that disclosure of the highlighted passages would be likely to prejudice UK-China relations, the UK's interests abroad, and the promotion of those interests. It accepted that China's sensitivity to criticism remained live and that the briefing pack contained the then FCO's strategic thinking and approach toward China, along with the steers given to the Prime Minister for the visit. Whilst acknowledging that the passage of time since 2013 diminished some of the concerns, the tribunal found that many of the underlying issues remained active. The public interest balance firmly favoured maintaining the exemption, notwithstanding the significant public interest in transparency around UK-China relations — including in the context of treatment of the Uyghur population.
Section 36: chilling effect arguments rejected
The more significant aspect of the judgement concerns the tribunal's treatment of section 36. The FCDO sought to extend the section 36 exemption beyond the information withheld under section 27, relying on the opinion of Minister West as the qualified person. That opinion was recorded in an email following a ministerial submission that focused primarily on the sensitivity of the information already withheld.
The tribunal applied the Upper Tribunal's guidance in Davies v IC and The Cabinet Office [2019] UKUT 185, and Charles J's analysis in Department of Health v IC and Lewis [2015] UKUT 0159, both of which caution against unsubstantiated assertions of a chilling effect. Neither the submission to the qualified person, the opinion itself, nor the witness statement of Mr Chugg addressed the specific content of the passages not already withheld under section 27. The section 36 arguments were generic and made no attempt to engage with the particular material at issue or the weakness inherent in chilling effect arguments — namely that civil servants are aware their communications may be subject to disclosure, and that properly advised officials cannot premise their candour on an expectation of confidentiality.
The tribunal concluded that there was no more than a very remote risk of any chilling effect from disclosure of the green-highlighted passages, falling well below the real and significant risk required under FOIA. The qualified person's opinion was not reasonable in extending to material that had not been analysed in that context.
Section 40: personal data exemption upheld
The tribunal upheld the FCDO's reliance on section 40(2) in relation to a small number of names and associated details. Although the appellant was found to be pursuing legitimate interests, disclosure of the personal data was not reasonably necessary for those interests, satisfying the requirements of article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR against the relevant individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy.
The FCDO is required to disclose the green-highlighted passages within 35 days of promulgation of the decision.
