Wandsworth v Young: Court of Appeal clarifies notification requirements for cessation of main housing duty

The Court of Appeal's recent judgement in The Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Wandsworth v Jerome Young [2025] EWCA Civ 1336 provides important clarification on the notification requirements when local housing authorities discharge their main housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996.

Mr Young, who suffers from autism spectrum disorder, was provided temporary accommodation by Wandsworth Council after the authority accepted it owed him the main housing duty in October 2019. Following an offer of permanent accommodation at 25 Diprose Lodge in March 2020, Mr Young signed a tenancy agreement but subsequently requested a review of the accommodation's suitability through his solicitor.

The council's review officer concluded in July 2020 that the accommodation was suitable and that by accepting the offer, Mr Young had discharged the previously accepted duty. Crucially, whilst the review decision letter informed Mr Young of his right to appeal to the County Court, it did not notify him of any right to request a further review of the decision that the main housing duty had ceased.

When Mr Young failed to vacate his temporary accommodation, possession proceedings were issued. His defence, raised through the Official Solicitor as litigation friend, contended that the main housing duty continued because the council had failed to properly notify him both that the duty had ended and of his right to request a review of that decision.

Lord Justice Newey, delivering the lead judgement with which Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing and Lord Justice Cobb agreed, rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the court held that section 184 of the Housing Act 1996, which deals with initial inquiries into homelessness applications, has no application to the cessation of duties already established. The requirements for ending the main housing duty are comprehensively set out in section 193 itself, which specifies different notification obligations depending on how the duty ceases.

The court noted that section 193(6)(c) states in unqualified terms that the duty "shall cease" if an applicant accepts an offer of Part VI accommodation. Unlike other cessation routes in section 193, no additional notification requirement is imposed beyond those specifically stated in the provision.

Second, even if notification of review rights had been required, the court held that Mr Young could not raise this issue in possession proceedings. Following established precedent from Tower Hamlets LBC v Rahanara Begum and subsequent authorities, the court emphasised that Parliament has created specific review and appeal procedures under sections 202-204 of the Act with strict time limits. Allowing challenges through different procedures much later would undermine this statutory scheme.

The judgement reinforces that where statutory review procedures exist, they must be used within prescribed timeframes. Whilst exceptional circumstances might justify departure from this principle, the mere failure to notify of review rights does not constitute such circumstances, particularly when considerable time has elapsed since the decision was communicated.

The decision highlights the importance of understanding the distinct notification requirements for different cessation routes under section 193. Whilst subsections dealing with refusals and private rented sector offers contain specific notification obligations, acceptance of Part VI accommodation operates differently, with cessation occurring automatically upon acceptance without additional procedural requirements.

The case serves as a reminder that housing authorities' decisions under Part VII should be challenged through the designated statutory procedures rather than as defences to possession proceedings, save in truly exceptional circumstances.