Unity Ship Group v Euroins Insurance: Master incompetence defeats general average claim

The Admiralty Court's recent decision in Unity Ship Group S.A. v Euroins Insurance JSC [2026] EWHC 7 (Admlty) provides a stark reminder of how crew incompetence can defeat general average recovery, even where defective passage planning alone might not suffice.

The bulk carrier Happy Aras grounded on the Datca peninsula in Turkey on 20 March 2023 whilst carrying soya beans from Ukraine to Turkey. The subsequent salvage operation generated general average expenses exceeding USD 3.1 million, with cargo interests' contribution assessed at USD 1.27 million. The cargo insurers refused payment, alleging the vessel was unseaworthy through inadequate crew competence and deficient passage planning.

The case turned largely on the conduct of the Master during the evening watch. Despite a passage plan requiring position fixes every 10-30 minutes, none were recorded. The Master deviated from the planned route by 'cutting the corner' at waypoint 53, sent the sole lookout below to make tea during nautical twilight, and missed the critical course alteration at waypoint 54. The vessel continued on a southerly heading at 9 knots, grounding at 20:58 without any apparent attempt to alter course or reduce speed.

AIS data contradicted the deck and engine logs, which contained what Admiralty Registrar Davison found to be false entries—including a purported course change at 20:05 that never occurred and engine movements that could not have taken place as recorded. The Master's statement to the Turkish Commercial Court was similarly inconsistent with the objective data.

Registrar Davison distinguished between mere negligence and incompetence, noting that whilst any professional might make isolated errors, the Master's conduct constituted 'a complete dereliction of duty'. The failures were numerous: no position plotting, unauthorised route deviation, removal of the lookout during restricted visibility, failure to monitor radar, and apparent disregard of the Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System. The subsequent falsification of records compounded these systemic failings.

Applying the test from The Cape Bonny, the court found a prudent owner would not have sent the vessel to sea with this Master had the deficiencies been known. The burden therefore shifted to the carrier to prove due diligence under Article III rule 1 of the Hague Rules.

The evidence fell markedly short. The beneficial owner's hearsay statement mentioned the Master's three years' service, positive performance evaluations, and a reference from a reputable company, but provided no supporting documentation beyond certificates of competence. As The Eurasian Dream established, certificates alone do not discharge the due diligence obligation. No evidence was adduced concerning ongoing supervision, specific instruction for the vessel and voyage, or any disciplinary investigation following the grounding. The Master and crew were not called to give evidence.

On passage planning, both experts agreed the plan was basic and incomplete, lacking waypoints for canal and strait transits, no-go areas, and cross-track limits. However, they concurred that had the plan been followed, the grounding would not have occurred. The court held that without causation, passage planning deficiencies alone could not render the vessel unseaworthy, though they formed part of the overall picture by placing greater responsibility on the Master.

The claim failed on the competence ground alone. Had liability been established, the court indicated it would have awarded the full general average sum claimed, as the defendant could not have reduced the contributory values sufficiently to affect the cargo contribution.

The decision reinforces that carriers must maintain proper systems for crew selection, training, and supervision, with contemporaneous documentation sufficient to withstand scrutiny when due diligence is challenged.

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