Ugolor v Ugolor: will set aside for want of knowledge and approval after court finds beneficiary likely drafted document

The High Court has pronounced against a homemade will purportedly made by Pamela Ayodele Festous in 2008, finding on the balance of probabilities that she lacked the necessary knowledge and approval of its contents at the time of execution. The judgement, delivered by Mr Simon Gleeson sitting as a deputy High Court judge, follows a challenge brought by three of the deceased's children against their brother Cameron Ugolor, who was named as sole principal beneficiary.

The court was satisfied that the will was not executed in 2008 as stated, but most probably in 2017. Two factors proved decisive: the address given for the testatrix was one she did not occupy until after 2014, and the document referred to Cameron by a name he did not begin using until around 2016, following a bankruptcy under a different name. An incorrect date does not of itself invalidate a will, and formal validity was accepted. The question was whether the testatrix understood and intended what she was signing.

Mental capacity distinguished from knowledge and approval

Expert psychiatric evidence from Dr Kathy Liu confirmed that by 2016 the deceased was suffering from late-onset psychotic disorder, most likely a very-late onset schizophrenia-like psychosis, against a background of longstanding paranoid personality features. Applying Banks v Goodfellow (1870), the court found insufficient evidence to conclude that these conditions had deprived her of testamentary capacity. The expert's view was that the affliction would not, of itself, have necessarily prevented her from understanding what making a will involved.

The court was careful to separate that finding from the knowledge and approval question. Following the single-stage approach endorsed in Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430, the judge asked simply whether the testatrix understood what was in the will and what its effect would be. On the evidence, he concluded she probably did not.

Suspicion raised and not allayed

The circumstances surrounding the document generated significant suspicion. The court found that Cameron had in all likelihood drafted the will himself — he had held himself out as legally qualified, was effectively the testatrix's sole carer, retained the original without informing any sibling of its existence, and had previously sought to obtain probate on a fabricated will in his father's name which was refused. As the sole beneficiary and probable drafter, the weight of Wintle v Nye [1959] 1 WLR 284 applied: the suspicion so created required convincing evidence to dispel it. None was forthcoming.

The testatrix, who had a continuing relationship with all three claimants in the period of likely execution, left them nothing whilst bequeathing £100,000 to adopted children with whom she had had no contact for decades. Her eyesight was reportedly poor, and no independent solicitor had explained the document to her. The witnesses to the will declined to assist the court, one stating he had been "advised not to discuss this matter with anybody".

Undue influence and constructive trust

The claim in undue influence failed. The judge accepted that Cameron had opportunity and motive, but held that positive coercion — sufficient to overbear the testatrix's volition — had not been proved to the standard required following Rea v Rea [2024] EWCA Civ 169. Without that finding, the constructive trust claim over sums raised by a charge on the deceased's property prior to her death also fell away, save for a £2,600 tenancy deposit which the first defendant was contractually obliged to repay and which the estate had discharged on his behalf.

Remedies

The first defendant was ordered to account to the estate for £11,737.18 withdrawn from the deceased's bank account eleven months after her death, and for £49,400 representing rental income and the deposit from the period following her death. Indemnity costs of £70,546 were awarded, the judge noting that Cameron's persistent non-compliance with court orders — including multiple failed applications for relief from sanctions — had driven the claimants to incur costs they should not have had to bear. The estate will now be distributed on intestacy.

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