Trafford Metropolitan Borough Council v Secretary of State: when planning permission precedes a masterplan

In a judgement handed down on 20 February 2026, Mr Justice Kimblin quashed a planning inspector's decision to allow an appeal for outline planning permission at New Carrington, Greater Manchester — finding that the inspector had fundamentally misunderstood the development plan policies in the Places for Everyone Joint Development Plan Document 2024 (PfE).

The case arose from Peel NRE Limited's application to Trafford Metropolitan Borough Council for development within Use Classes B2 and B8 on land west of Manchester Road, Carrington. The site falls within a major strategic allocation under PfE, which envisages some 5,000 new dwellings, 350,000m² of employment floorspace, and substantial new infrastructure including the Carrington Relief Road and improvements to Junction 8 of the M60. The Council refused permission on the basis that Peel had declined to make a proportionate contribution to that infrastructure. On appeal, the inspector allowed the application, concluding that the contribution sought under the Council's Interim New Carrington Developer Contributions Formula (NCCF) was not justified and that, assessed in isolation, the scheme would not give rise to severe highway impacts under paragraph 116 of the NPPF.

Kimblin J accepted that it was a legitimate planning judgement to afford the NCCF little weight — the Council had itself conceded that the formula had not been the subject of public consultation or viability testing, and the inspector was entitled to conclude that the quantum sought was not adequately justified. That aspect of the decision was unimpeachable.

The error lay in what the inspector did next. Having rejected the Council's figure, he treated the matter as closed and turned to the planning balance without ever addressing whether any proportionate contribution was required at all. Policy JPA30, criterion 1, is unambiguous: development across the New Carrington allocation must be planned and delivered in a co-ordinated and comprehensive manner, with proportionate contributions to fund necessary infrastructure. That obligation does not evaporate in the absence of an adopted masterplan. The masterplan is, as Kimblin J observed, a second step in a stepwise approach; the strategic allocation and its associated policy requirements come first.

By applying the national policy threshold for highway severity as a substitute for engaging with the development plan's infrastructure requirements, the inspector conflated two distinct exercises. The question was not merely whether the appeal scheme alone would cause severe highway impacts, but whether granting permission without any proportionate contribution was consistent with a development plan that expressly distributes the costs of allocation-wide infrastructure across component sites and landowners. The burden that would fall upon other developers within the allocation if Peel contributed nothing was a material consideration the inspector was required to address — consistent with the reasoning in Persimmon Homes North Midlands Ltd v Secretary of State [2011] EWHC 3931, though without that case compelling any particular outcome.

The judgement reaffirms the principle, grounded in Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] and confirmed in Aberdeen City and Shire Strategic Development Planning Authority v Elsick Development Company Limited [2017] UKSC 66, that pooled contributions to allocation-wide infrastructure can satisfy Regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 where the development plan so requires. Difficulty in quantifying the precise sum does not render the underlying obligation dispensable — decision-makers operating without a masterplan must still grapple with whether any contribution is warranted, even where the exact figure remains uncertain.

Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 6 succeeded. Grounds 4 and 5 — concerning the inspector's failure to identify the specific weight attached to the policy breach, and his failure to address a proposed repayment mechanism — failed. The decision letter was quashed.

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