The nightmare of unregulated sperm donation using a sperm ‘super donor’

Three judgments have been released this year regarding ‘Joe Donor’, the prolific unregulated sperm donor, and a fourth is expected soon. In the first, A v B [2023] EWFC 333, released in February 2025 after a hearing in October/November 2023 (delayed due to his rejected appeal and a prospective appeal to the European Court which presumably did not go anywhere), the sperm donor and applicant in the proceedings was publicly named as Robert Albon. A US citizen, he came to the UK in September 2020 enroute to the Netherlands and Germany, but was prevented from leaving due to the Covid-19 lockdown. He has been in the UK ever since and clearly wishes to stay. If he returns to the US, he faces an arrest warrant for unpaid child maintenance for a child he fathered via sperm donation in Wisconsin and an order for alimony concerning his ex-wife.

A v B was a private law case involving a same-sex female couple (‘B’ and ‘C’) who conceived a child (‘D’) via sperm donation from Robert Albon (‘A’). The second and third cases were heard together by Mr Justice Poole in the Middlesbrough family court and reported as Re CA and Ors (Children of Unregulated Sperm Donor) EWFC 130 involving two local authorities and individually cited as Redcar and Cleveland BC v LP and ors and Durham CC v KS and ors. These were public law proceedings involving single women who had conceived via sperm donation from Robert Albon and who faced their children being adopted or put in long-term foster care.

A v B [2023] EWFC 333

B was the birth mother (and as such the legal mother with automatic parental responsibility) and C was her wife. However, as D was conceived via artificial insemination using A’s sperm prior to their marriage, A was the legal father, and C had no legal rights or parental responsibility. 

The applications before the court were:

• A’s application for a child arrangements order for time with D, for parental responsibility and changes to D’s name;
• A’s application for a declaration of parentage;
• C’s application for parental responsibility and a child arrangements order formalising D’s time with her as, during the course of the proceedings, B and C had separated;
• The guardian’s application for a s91(14) order to prevent A from making further court applications without the court’s prior approval, and requiring that the judgment be reported naming him to alert the public to the dangers of unregulated sperm donation.

The judge was able to easily deal with C’s applications and granted the ‘lives with’ child arrangements order under Section 8 of the Children Act 1989, which provided C with parental responsibility.  The court found  that it was both necessary and proportionate for the order to be made, in recognition  of C’s important and continuing role in D’s life. 

The making of this order would have been extremely important for C (and D) because the conception took place before their marriage, meaning that she had no legal rights, a situation exacerbated by C and B’s separation.

What they had not expected when choosing A as the donor was to end up embroiled in heavily contested Children Act proceedings, with A making claims that went against their initial agreement. This is one of the risks facing women who are unmarried (or who are single) when using an unregulated sperm donor. Any known sperm donation agreement is unenforceable, and legal fathers can make use of the courts.

Ultimately, A failed in all his applications. In respect of the name change, the judge found no positive welfare benefit for D and refused the application. A’s application for contact with D was also refused. Whilst acknowledging that it is generally best for children to have a relationship with both parents, the judge found that there would be no real emotional or psychological benefit in D knowing A, and that the risk of harm was too great, ‘because of the character and mindset of A.’ Similarly, A’s application for parental responsibility was refused. B, C and the guardian were all concerned that if A had parental responsibility, he would use it to control the mothers, and that his motivation for wanting it was not child focused.

The judge refused to hear A’s application for a declaration of parentage, which if made, would have seen A named on D’s birth certificate as father, on the basis that it was not in D’s best interests for him to do so.

The judge granted the guardian’s application for a Section 91(14) order, which was made until D’s 16th birthday, meaning that A cannot make any further applications to court in respect of D without the court’s permission. This provides a filter so that B and C are not troubled with any more spurious applications unless the court deems the application can proceed.

Crucially, the judge also granted the guardian’s application to name A for the benefit of the wider public.

Re CA and Ors (Children of Unregulated Sperm Donor) EWFC 130

Redcar and Cleveland BC v LP & ors

The child in this case (‘CA’) was born in March 2023, conceived via natural insemination, so-called ‘NI’ (aka sexual intercourse) between the mother, ‘MA’ and the applicant, Robert Albon.  MA also had another child, a maternal half-brother to CA, named CZ in the judgment, who was just 17 months older than CA. The local authority, Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council (‘Redcar’), had originally sought care orders in respect of CA and CZ. A final order was made in respect of CZ, who remained living with MA under a child arrangements order. Redcar and CA’s guardian also supported a child arrangements order for CA with a family assistance order. Albon made three applications in respect of CA: 

• a declaration of parentage order;
• a parental responsibility order; and
• a spends time with order.

The guardian was concerned that if a declaration of parentage order were made, and CA’s birth re-registered naming Albon as father, then on the face of it, anyone would assume that Albon had parental responsibility by virtue of being named on the birth certificate. However, re-registration of a birth following the making of a declaration of parentage order does not confer parental responsibility. When making the declaration of parentage order, in order to allay the guardian’s fears, the judge therefore ordered that a short statement be appended to the order, which should be provided to healthcare providers, schools and other bodies or authorities with whom CA was registered, to explain that the naming of Albon on CA’s birth certificate did not give him parental responsibility.

It follows that Albon’s application for parental responsibility was refused, as was his application to spend time with CA. The parenting assessments of Albon were all negative and MA, Redcar and the guardian were concerned about the impact on MA of any direct contact between CA and Albon. She was considered to be vulnerable, with her ability to parent CA likely to be impacted if Albon were to have time with CA, which would not be in her interests. In addition, the judge found that it would be emotionally and psychologically harmful to CA to form an attachment to Albon as he would probably fail to commit to her, as he had done with all his other relationships.

Albon’s contact with CA was limited to indirect contact once a year. A Family Assistance Order for six months was also made to assist MA, along with a Section 91(14) order preventing Albon from bringing any further applications in relation to CA for a period of five years.

Durham CC v KS and ors

The second case involved ‘CB’, a girl born in May 2022, also conceived via sexual intercourse between Albon and her mother, ‘MB’. CB also had an older half-brother, named ‘CX’, who was three and a half years older than CB and had complex needs.

In contrast to the CA case, Albon was named on CB’s birth certificate, so was her biological and legal father and already had parental responsibility for her. Durham County Council (‘Durham’) and the guardian supported both CB and CX being either separately adopted or separately placed in long-term foster care. MB supported Durham’s applications, but they were opposed by Albon in respect of CB. Albon, in fact, sought an order that CB be placed in his full-time care or for more extensive post-adoption contact if a placement order were made. 

MB was another vulnerable woman, who was assessed as having a lower-than-average IQ and had suffered relational trauma in childhood. She had five other children, all of whom had been taken into care prior to her conception of CX and CB. 

Albon assured the court that if CB were placed in his care, he would cease all of his sperm donor activity. The judge did not accept that assurance. He described Albon as having a “compulsion to create more children.” Whilst recognising that Albon would likely be able to meet her practical day-to-day needs, placing CB in his care would not be in her lifelong best interests. Albon had a history of abandoning children, lacked empathy and would not be able to provide CB with stability or emotional warmth. Adoption was the best outcome for CB as it would provide her with a permanent family. The judge, therefore, made a care and placement order for CB, as well as CX. Post-adoption contact for Albon was limited to letterbox contact, twice a year. 

Whilst neither MB nor Albon, as parents with parental responsibility, consented to the adoption, the judge ruled that he was satisfied that he should dispense with their consent.

Conclusion

The judge questioned Albon’s motivation not only to be a sperm donor, but also to bring these cases in respect of these children. Was he motivated by the desire to have sex with many different women, compelled to reproduce, gratified by knowing he had fathered scores of children, simply attention seeking, or trying to secure immigration status? This latter motivation was found by the judge as being the most likely, a finding also made by HHJ Furness KC in the A v B case, as it would clearly assist his immigration application if he were to prove that he had a subsisting family life in the UK. Siring British children would not be enough. He would need to establish a parental or familial relationship with them. Fortunately, with these judgments, he has failed to do so. 

But what of the women’s motivations? The judge concluded that the women using Albon as their sperm donor mostly fall into two camps: women in a lesbian relationship and single women. Whilst the benefits of unregulated sperm donation are that it is cheap, available almost immediately and has no conditions attached, there are significant risks which anyone thinking of using unregulated sperm donation must consider. It is worth quoting the list of significant risks and potential complications from paragraph 100 of Re CA and Ors in full: 

‘a. The risk that he is carrying a sexually transmitted or other infection; 

b. The risk that he could pass on a genetic disorder to the child;

c. The risk that the child may unknowingly form a relationship with a half-sibling; 

d. Misunderstandings about the role he will have in the child’s life; 

e. The risk that he would seek unwanted involvement in the life of the child including declarations of parentage and/or a grant of parental responsibility; 

f. Legal disputes and litigation involving the child; 

g. The risk that the mother would not provide safe parenting for the child; 

h. Problematic issues in the child’s upbringing concerning their identity, the circumstances of their conception, and the number and unknown identities and whereabouts of their half-siblings.’

These cases have understandably received significant media attention. One hopes that the message will reach those women considering conceiving children via unregulated sperm donation and that they will take heed from these women’s nightmarish experiences and think again.