The Chief Constable of Sussex Police & Anor v XGY: legal implications of advocate immunity

Case overview

The Court of Appeal has clarified the scope of advocate immunity in The Chief Constable of Sussex Police & Anor v XGY [2025] EWCA Civ 1230, reversing the High Court's decision and reinstating the striking out of claims arising from the disclosure of a domestic violence victim's address during bail proceedings.

XGY brought claims under the Human Rights Act 1998, Data Protection Act 2018, and for breach of confidence after a CPS advocate revealed her confidential address whilst seeking bail conditions to protect her from her former partner, DYP. Sussex Police had provided the address to the CPS without marking it as confidential.

The immunity principles

The Court of Appeal, led by Lady Chief Justice Carr, emphasised that the core immunity protecting advocates, witnesses, judges and jurors from suit for matters said or done in court has existed since at least the sixteenth century. This immunity applies regardless of how claims are framed and cannot be "outflanked" by alternative causes of action, including statutory claims under the HRA or DPA.

Ritchie J had introduced a requirement for case-by-case "justificationism", suggesting immunities beyond core protections needed individual factual justification. The Court of Appeal firmly rejected this approach. Once conduct falls within established immunity, no further justification is required. The immunity must be foreseeable at the time of the statement to enable those involved in justice administration to speak freely.

The Court distinguished between justifying categories of immunity (which requires careful scrutiny) and applying established immunity to individual cases (which does not). Ritchie J's analysis had incorrectly conflated these distinct concepts and misread authorities including Taylor v Director of the Serious Fraud Office and Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands.

Extension to police conduct

The established extension of core immunity to pre-trial matters protected Sussex Police's provision of the address to the CPS. This conduct formed part of the investigatory and preparatory process for criminal proceedings. The Court noted that bail hearings require complainants' addresses to assess proportionate exclusion zones, making the information material rather than extraneous.

The Court drew parallels with CLG v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police, where similar disclosure of witnesses' addresses to the CPS fell within the immunity. Holding the police liable would circumvent the CPS advocate's protection.

The HRA dimension

The Court rejected suggestions that HRA claims somehow escape immunity. Parliament's intention to override common law immunity must be clearly expressed or arise by necessary implication. The HRA contains no such provision. The Bar Council's evidence highlighted the practical difficulties if personal data claims were exempt from immunity, potentially miring criminal proceedings in technical debates about permissible references to such data.

Section 7 victim status

Additionally, the Court reinstated HHJ Brownhill's summary judgement that XGY failed to meet the "victim" criterion under section 7 HRA. The test requires establishing a real and immediate risk at the material time. With no contact from DYP during the five months between November 2019 and April 2020, despite his knowledge of previous addresses, no such risk existed when the Hampshire address was disclosed.

The Court expressed sympathy for XGY's situation whilst confirming that public policy and established principle precluded a legal remedy. The decision reinforces that immunity applies across all claims, however formulated, when conduct falls within its established scope.