Tattersall v Tattersall: serious harm threshold defeats Facebook defamation claim

The High Court has struck out a defamation claim arising from a Facebook post in Tattersall v Tattersall [2025] EWHC 2558 (KB), finding that the claimant failed to plead or prove serious harm to reputation as required by s.1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013.

Background

The dispute concerned a single Facebook post published by Mrs Yvonne Tattersall in September 2021 during contentious County Court proceedings with her late husband's mother, Mrs Elizabeth Tattersall. The post referenced the family dispute without naming the claimant, stating that "people who used to be my friend have decided to support my mother in law, a women who has tried to make me homeless and continually told lies about me."

Following a trial of preliminary issues, the court determined that whilst meanings 1(a) and 1(b)—concerning the defendant's social isolation and partisan friends—were not defamatory, two meanings did bear defamatory tendency: that the claimant had been trying to deprive the defendant of her home, and that the claimant had been telling lies about the defendant.

Defective pleadings

Mrs Justice Collins Rice DBE CB found the particulars of claim fundamentally flawed in addressing the serious harm test. The pleadings improperly focused on the claimant's subjective distress and anxiety rather than objective reputational impact on readers' minds—the statutory requirement under Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2020] AC 612.

Paragraphs asserting "enormous impact on the Claimant" and the claimant feeling "unable to return to Whalley" addressed emotional harm, not reputational damage. The court emphasised that subjective reaction may go to quantum but cannot satisfy the threshold statutory test.

The pleaded inferential case lacked adequate particularity. Whilst asserting that "many within Whalley" likely saw the post and that the parties were "well known" locally, the particulars failed to articulate the factual basis for these assertions or explain how they supported serious reputational harm. References to supportive comments on the post were held incapable of demonstrating harm, as they largely addressed other matters and demonstrated pre-existing partisan views about the family dispute.

Evidential deficiencies

The court had the unusual advantage of seeing all available evidence at an interlocutory stage. The claimant's witness statement, spanning 16 pages, predominantly described her personal reaction rather than third-party impact. Evidence concerning ten friends and family who contacted her following publication failed to demonstrate that these individuals thought worse of the claimant; at most, the claimant "felt" seeds of doubt had been planted.

The court found it "inherently improbable" that close friends and family would form seriously adverse views based on a single Facebook post about a known family dispute. The responsive comments on Facebook, largely offering emotional support to the defendant regarding unrelated allegations, could not support an inference of serious reputational harm to the claimant.

On extent of publication, the court declined to draw significantly adverse inferences against the defendant under Armory v Delamirie principles, particularly where deletion occurred following the claimant's solicitors' request. Even assuming primary publication at "the top end of the reasonable range"—potentially around 200 Facebook friends—this remained relatively modest for a closed category with no evidential basis for substantial republication.

Application of statutory test

The court concluded that the inherent gravity of the allegations, their incidental role in the post's narrative, the moderate extent of publication to a polarised audience, and absence of evidence from publishees meant the claim had no realistic prospect of establishing serious harm. The pleadings and evidence fell "a long way short of advancing a positive case beyond the allusive and speculative."

Mrs Justice Collins Rice struck out and dismissed the claim, noting that Parliament intended the serious harm test to protect freedom of expression and prevent scarce judicial resources being consumed by claims lacking objectively demonstrable real-life reputational impact. Allowing the claim to continue would itself constitute "an interference with freedom of expression that is not necessary for the protection of the Claimant's reputation."