Shvidler v Secretary of State: sanctions proportionality and individual rights

The Supreme Court's judgement in Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs represents a pivotal examination of sanctions law under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA). Delivered on 29 July 2025, the decision addresses fundamental questions about the proportionality of sanctions measures against individuals with minimal connections to sanctioned regimes.

Eugene Shvidler, a British citizen resident in the UK for many years, and his company Dalston Projects Ltd challenged approximately 65 concurrent sanctions measures imposed under SAMLA and the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Critically, Shvidler maintained no political or operational links to the Russian government, distinguishing his case from typical sanctions challenges.

The Supreme Court applied rigorous proportionality analysis, establishing a four-part test that will likely influence future sanctions jurisprudence. The court first confirmed that deterring Russian aggression constituted a sufficiently important objective warranting sanctions measures. This finding aligns with established principles that sanctions serve legitimate foreign policy goals within the international legal framework.

Examining the rational connection between sanctions and objectives, the court acknowledged that whilst individual designations might not immediately alter state behaviour, their cumulative effect remained significant. The court recognised the expressive function of sanctions in demonstrating state disapproval of aggressor actions, moving beyond purely instrumental considerations.

The assessment of less intrusive alternatives proved particularly significant. The court rejected Shvidler's argument that his designation would prove ineffective in influencing Russian politics. Government evidence suggested that pressure on elite individuals, even those peripherally connected to the regime, could contribute to eventual political shifts. This reasoning expands the potential scope of legitimate sanctions targets beyond direct government actors.

The final proportionality limb—balancing individual rights against collective interests—generated the most contentious analysis. The majority acknowledged the serious impact on Shvidler's rights whilst maintaining that such interference remained justified given national security imperatives and foreign policy necessities. The court emphasised that sanctions effects, though severe, did not constitute wholly oppressive measures given the exceptional circumstances.

Lord Leggatt's dissent proved particularly prescient in highlighting the risks of arbitrary sanctions designation. His analysis criticised the broad, indiscriminate nature of sanctions imposed purely on associational grounds rather than substantive wrongdoing. This dissent raises crucial questions about the scope of legitimate sanctions targets and the procedural safeguards required when fundamental rights are engaged.

The judgement establishes important precedential value for the intersection of human rights law and sanctions regimes. The court's application of European Convention on Human Rights principles, particularly regarding private and family life and property rights, creates a framework for evaluating future sanctions challenges.

The decision's broader implications extend beyond individual cases to questions of state power and democratic accountability. The court's acceptance that sanctions may legitimately target individuals without direct regime connections significantly expands governmental discretion in sanctions designation, whilst simultaneously establishing proportionality requirements that may constrain such power.

The Shvidler case ultimately reflects the evolving tensions between collective security measures and individual liberties within democratic societies. The judgement provides essential guidance for navigating these competing interests whilst establishing parameters for proportionality analysis in sanctions law that will influence both domestic and international legal development.