Secretary of State challenges SIAC's costs jurisdiction in landmark judicial review

SIAC lacks authority to award costs following withdrawal of immigration decisions, Administrative Court rules.
The Administrative Court's judgement in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Special Immigration Appeals Commission, delivered on 31 July 2025, has clarified significant jurisdictional boundaries regarding the Special Immigration Appeals Commission's (SIAC) power to award costs in immigration proceedings.
The judicial review arose from proceedings involving an applicant, anonymised as FGF, whose naturalisation application was refused on good character grounds. Following FGF's challenge in SIAC, the Secretary of State withdrew the original refusal decision mid-proceedings. FGF subsequently sought a costs award, prompting fundamental questions about SIAC's jurisdictional scope.
In February 2024, SIAC determined it possessed jurisdiction to grant costs, analogising its powers to those of the High Court in judicial review proceedings. This decision prompted the Secretary of State to seek judicial review, arguing that SIAC lacked authority to award costs where no substantive decision had been made to set aside the original determination—a prerequisite absent following mere withdrawal.
Dame Victoria Sharp and Mrs Justice Farbey examined two central issues: whether SIAC possesses jurisdiction to award costs when applications are made to set aside naturalisation decisions, and whether such jurisdiction extends to cases involving withdrawn refusals rather than formal determinations.
The Administrative Court concluded that SIAC had exceeded its statutory powers. The judgement emphasised SIAC's status as a tribunal operating within specific legislative constraints, distinguishing it from the High Court's inherent jurisdiction. SIAC's powers derive exclusively from the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act's specific provisions, rather than any inherent authority analogous to superior courts.
The court stressed that SIAC's procedural framework differs markedly from standard judicial review, particularly given its reliance on sensitive national security information. This structural distinction reinforces the tribunal's limited statutory remit and undermines arguments for expansive cost-awarding powers.
Addressing submissions concerning access to justice and Human Rights Act implications, the court determined that procedural limitations regarding costs do not constitute breaches of fundamental rights. The judgement established clear boundaries between SIAC's capabilities and conventional judicial review procedures, emphasising that any extension of costs powers requires explicit legislative provision rather than judicial inference.
The decision carries broader implications for immigration law practice. The court's emphasis on legal certainty and consistency addresses concerns about one-party costs recovery in SIAC proceedings, whilst maintaining the tribunal's specialised function within national security contexts.
The Administrative Court allowed the judicial review claim, quashing SIAC's costs ruling. This precedent reinforces the principle that statutory tribunals must operate within their designated parameters, regardless of apparent procedural similarities to superior courts.
The judgement provides essential guidance on SIAC's jurisdictional limits, particularly regarding costs awards in withdrawn cases. It underscores the importance of legislative clarity in defining tribunal powers and maintains the constitutional separation between judicial interpretation and parliamentary intent.
This decision will influence future SIAC proceedings and costs applications, establishing that withdrawal of immigration decisions does not trigger the tribunal's limited costs jurisdiction. The ruling preserves the distinction between SIAC's specialised statutory role and the broader powers of administrative courts, ensuring procedural certainty within the complex landscape of immigration and national security law.