Ocean One Hundred v New Forest National Park Authority: apparent bias and the limits of CLEUD revocation

The Court of Appeal has allowed an appeal against the revocation of a certificate of lawful existing use or development (CLEUD), holding that the planning officer responsible for the report to the decision-making board had conducted himself in a manner that gave rise to an appearance of bias — and that his report, as a consequence, was neither fair nor balanced. The judgement, handed down on 23 April 2026, carries significant implications for any local planning authority (LPA) contemplating revocation under s.193(7) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

The case had its origins in a 2007 CLEUD application by Mr Jonathan Cox for land near Bransgore in the New Forest National Park. His application, on a proper reading, sought to certify only the storage of touring caravans on part of a 2.57-hectare site. In August 2008, the New Forest National Park Authority (NPA) issued a certificate in materially broader terms, declaring the bulk of the site lawful as a "caravan site" — a statutory term of art importing use for human habitation. Why the certificate was issued in those terms remained, as Holgate LJ described it, "a mystery."

Following a change of ownership and an attempted large-scale redevelopment in 2019, Lord Manners — a local resident — put a case to the NPA in 2020 to revoke the CLEUD under s.193(7). That provision permits revocation only where the LPA is satisfied that a materially false statement was made, or that material information was withheld, on the original application. It cannot be used to correct the LPA's own errors of fact or law.

The revocation process was directed by the NPA's Executive Director (Strategy and Planning), Mr Steven Avery, who prepared the officer's report recommending revocation to the Board. The Board resolved accordingly in October 2023. Ocean One Hundred Limited, as current owner, sought judicial review.

Jay J in the High Court declined to find apparent bias, concluding that Mr Avery, not being the ultimate decision-maker, could not have infected the Board's decision. The Court of Appeal disagreed firmly. Holgate LJ held that the relevant question was not whether the officer was himself the decision-maker, but whether his report was sufficiently fair and balanced to allow the Board to reach genuinely independent conclusions. It was not.

The findings against Mr Avery were striking. He had attended a private meeting at an objector's home, sent procedural updates to the pro-revocation side only — including matters discussed in confidential sessions — shared his draft report with that side and amended it in response to their suggestions, provided material to them on a confidential basis, and deleted an important email chain. Even accounting for mitigating factors, the judge at first instance had found that had Mr Avery been the decision-maker himself, apparent bias would have been established. The NPA did not challenge that finding on appeal.

The officer's report compounded the difficulty by failing to address several central issues the Board was required to resolve: the proper scope of Mr Cox's application; what he had told enforcement officers; whether the CLEUD team would likely have had access to the enforcement file; and the significance of a 1979 planning appeal decision establishing that any caravan use had historically been confined to five touring caravans on a certified club site of 0.1 hectares — not the bulk of 2.57 hectares.

Holgate LJ also offered broader guidance on the procedure LPAs should adopt when pursuing revocation, including the potential need for separation of functions between those promoting revocation and those advising on it, robust record-keeping, and timely disclosure to affected parties. Where a CLEUD is to be revoked — a decision carrying no right of appeal and potentially serious consequences for landowners — the process must be "scrupulously fair."

The appeal was allowed. The revocation of the CLEUD is quashed.