Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Martin Groom: Coastguard volunteers are workers

The Court of Appeal has ruled that Coastguard Rescue Officers (CROs) who receive remuneration for their work qualify as "workers" under employment law, despite being designated as volunteers. This significant decision affects approximately 3,100 CROs and has broader implications for volunteer organisations that provide payments beyond expenses.

Martin Groom served as a CRO with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency from 1985 until his dismissal in 2020. When denied union representation at an appeal hearing, he challenged whether he qualified as a worker under section 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The Employment Tribunal initially found no contractual relationship existed, emphasising the voluntary nature of the arrangement and the absence of automatic remuneration.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal reversed this decision, finding that contracts arose when CROs attended activities for which they were entitled to claim payment. The MCA's appeal to the Court of Appeal raised three grounds, principally arguing that the EAT wrongly interfered with the ET's evaluative conclusion and that no mutuality of obligation existed.

Lord Justice Bean, delivering the leading judgement, emphasised that this was fundamentally a question of statutory interpretation rather than simple contract construction. The three governing documents—the Volunteer Handbook, Code of Conduct, and remuneration document—formed a coherent set reflecting the actual relationship between parties.

Whilst CROs faced no obligation to attend particular call-outs and could specify their availability, once attending they were bound to follow reasonable instructions and entitled to claim hourly remuneration plus expenses. The Court rejected the proposition that labelling the relationship as "voluntary" precluded contractual status, noting it would be "quite unreal" to suggest no intention to create legal relations existed when CROs could enforce payment claims.

The Court distinguished genuine volunteer cases like South East Sheffield Citizens Advice Bureau v Grayson, where volunteers received only travel expenses. Here, the remuneration document explicitly provided for "claims for time (hourly rate) remuneration" described as "compensation for any disruption to your personal life and employment"—the essence of remuneration rather than mere expense reimbursement.

Recent Supreme Court authority proved decisive. Uber BV v Aslam established that individuals need not be obliged to work at particular times to qualify as workers. Professional Game Match Officials Ltd v HMRC confirmed that contracts could be limited to periods during which paid work was performed, with sufficient mutuality of obligation existing even within those limited periods.

The Court rejected the MCA's argument that CROs remained free to abandon activities mid-way. Lord Justice Stuart-Smith noted such freedom would be inconsistent with the safety-critical nature of rescue work and the Code of Conduct requirement to comply with reasonable requests.

The decision confirms that the absence of an umbrella contract and freedom to decline work does not preclude worker status during periods of actual work. The critical factor was the wage/work bargain: CROs undertook to perform services personally in return for remuneration at rates not less than the national minimum wage.

This judgement has far-reaching implications for organisations using paid volunteers across emergency services and beyond. The distinction between genuine volunteers and workers turns not on labels but on whether remuneration beyond expenses is provided for work performed. Where such arrangements exist, organisations must recognise the accompanying employment rights, including minimum wage protections, holiday pay, and rights concerning disciplinary processes.

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