London Borough of Enfield v A clarifies notification duties in out-of-borough placements

The Court of Appeal's judgement in London Borough of Enfield v A [2025] EWCA Civ 1355 provides important clarification on two recurring issues in homelessness law: the extent of a local authority's duty to search for accommodation close to an applicant's former home, and the consequences of failing to notify a host authority within the statutory timeframe under section 208 of the Housing Act 1996.

Ms A applied to Enfield for homelessness assistance in August 2022 after suffering domestic abuse from her ex-partner, who received a custodial sentence for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Enfield accepted the full housing duty under section 193(2) of the Act. Given Ms A's well-founded fear of violence from her ex-partner and his associates, she did not wish to remain in Enfield. In April 2023, Enfield offered temporary accommodation in neighbouring Haringey, approximately 1½ miles from Enfield's boundary. Ms A accepted but requested a review of suitability on multiple grounds, including inadequate size, proximity to the area of risk, and lack of necessary facilities.

The county court judge quashed Enfield's review decision, finding the authority had failed to demonstrate it had searched for accommodation closer to Ms A's former home. The judge also held that Enfield's failure to notify Haringey within 14 days under section 208(2) and (4) of the Act invalidated the placement decision.

Lord Justice Lewison, delivering the leading judgement with which Lords Justices Snowden and Cobb agreed, allowed Enfield's appeal on both grounds. On the first issue, the Court held that whilst local authorities must consider location when assessing suitability, there is no separate statutory duty to search for accommodation as close as possible to an applicant's former home. The relevant question is whether the offered accommodation is suitable, considering all relevant factors including affordability and proximity. The Court emphasised that section 208(1) only requires authorities to secure accommodation "so far as reasonably practicable" in their own district. Where an applicant cannot be accommodated in the local authority's area—particularly where, as here, the applicant actively wished to leave that area—the authority must provide suitable accommodation elsewhere, but this does not impose an obligation to conduct an exhaustive search for the closest possible alternative.

The second ground raised a question of wider significance. Drawing on recent Supreme Court authority including A1 Properties Ltd v Tudor Studios RTM Co Ltd [2024] UKSC 27 and R (Layden) [2025] UKSC 12, the Court adopted a modern approach to statutory procedural requirements, focusing on the purpose of the requirement and whether any prejudice flows from non-compliance.

Lord Justice Lewison identified the primary purpose of section 208 notification as enabling host authorities to know when the prescribed period under section 198(4) began, thereby allocating responsibility between housing authorities for subsequent applications. The duty is owed to the host authority, not the applicant, who has no entitlement to be informed whether notification has been given. Crucially, the duty only arises after accommodation has been made available and does not affect suitability.

The Court held that if accommodation is suitable when offered and accepted, it cannot become unsuitable 14 days later merely because the placing authority failed to notify the host authority. To hold otherwise would give applicants a windfall power to upset otherwise lawful decisions. The notification duty is collateral to the question of suitability and its breach does not impugn the lawfulness of a review decision on suitability.

This judgement reinforces that section 204 appeals are limited to grounds affecting the legality of review decisions on suitability. Procedural failures unconnected to suitability—particularly where no prejudice results to the party entitled to receive notification—do not provide grounds for quashing accommodation decisions. The decision provides welcome clarity on the scope of both substantive duties regarding location and procedural requirements under the homelessness legislation.