Judgment on homelessness shapes legal duties

A recent Supreme Court ruling clarifies local authorities' responsibilities for providing temporary housing to families in need
In the notable case Glasgow City Council v X (Scotland), the Supreme Court addressed pivotal issues regarding the obligations of local authorities to provide suitable temporary accommodation for homeless families, particularly under Scottish legislation. This judgement, delivered on 9 April 2025, stems from a complicated legal dispute initiated when an appellant, identified only as X, contested the accommodation offered by Glasgow City Council. X and her husband were granted asylum status in February 2020 and recognised as eligible for temporary housing. However, the local authority could only present them with a four-apartment property, which they argued was insufficient for their family's requirements, especially in light of their son's autism and specific needs.
An occupational therapist had evaluated their situation and advised that a five-apartment property was essential, considering their son’s additional support needs. Initially, the Lord Ordinary sided with X, asserting the council held an absolute duty to provide suitable accommodation that accounted for all household members’ specific needs. Nevertheless, the Inner House of the Court of Session reversed this ruling, asserting that accommodation could still be classified as adequate even if it did not cater to the unique needs of every family member.
The Supreme Court undertook a detailed review of the statutory framework governing local authority housing responsibilities, focusing particularly on Section 29 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 and Article 4(b) of the Homeless Persons (Unsuitable Accommodation) (Scotland) Order 2014. The Court articulated that the precise language used in these legal texts was essential for determining the extent of council obligations. They highlighted a significant distinction: while local authorities must consider the needs of the household when securing temporary housing, they are not mandated to fulfill those needs directly with the provided accommodation.
This differentiation between “meeting” needs and “taking account” of them is central to the ongoing discourse regarding the adequacy of temporary housing. The Court acknowledged that standards for assessing suitability in temporary accommodation differ greatly from those for permanent housing, as councils bear a greater responsibility to meet the specific needs of individuals in permanent arrangements.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that X’s appeal should be dismissed, affirming that the council had fulfilled its statutory obligations. They duly considered the family’s needs in arranging transitional housing, despite the accommodation not being an exact match for their requirements. This decision provides vital clarity on interpreting the responsibilities assigned to local authorities under current legislation, highlighting the necessity for a balanced approach that reflects both the legal framework and the practical housing challenges present in Scotland.
Overall, this ruling accentuates the crucial role judicial interpretation plays in ensuring that legislative obligations evolve in line with the real needs of vulnerable communities. It also underscores the persistent complexities local authorities confront amid limited housing resources. The Supreme Court's decision could significantly influence future interpretations of housing policy and local authority duties, reinforcing the importance of providing support for vulnerable families in Scottish housing law