JSC Kazan Oil Plant v Aves Trade: time limits for arbitration appeals

When time starts running for appeals against FOSFA arbitration awards under section 70(3)
The Commercial Court has struck out a section 69 appeal brought 43 days after a FOSFA appeal award was issued, clarifying when time begins to run under section 70(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996 where an arbitral appeal process has been exhausted.
JSC Kazan Oil Plant (the Claimant) contracted to sell crude sunflower oil to Aves Trade DMCC (the Defendant) under a FOSFA contract. Following a dispute, the first-tier tribunal ruled in favour of the Defendant on 27 March 2024. The Claimant appealed, and the FOSFA Board of Appeal issued its award on 26 March 2025.
FOSFA notified the parties that the appeal award was available on 26 March 2025, subject to payment of outstanding fees. The Claimant, a Russian entity, encountered difficulties paying due to sanctions. Payment was ultimately made through a UAE intermediary on 8 April 2025, and the appeal award was released on 10 April 2025.
The Claimant issued its section 69 appeal on 8 May 2025—precisely 28 days after receiving the award but 43 days after its date. The Defendant applied to strike out the claim as time-barred.
The central issue
Section 70(3) requires applications or appeals under sections 67, 68 or 69 to be brought within 28 days "of the date of the award or, if there has been any arbitral process of appeal or review, of the date when the applicant or appellant was notified of the result of that process."
The Claimant contended that time ran from when it received the appeal award on 10 April 2025. The Defendant argued time ran from the award's date, 26 March 2025.
The court's analysis
Mr Justice Bright reviewed the leading authorities: UR Power GmbH v Kuok Oils and Grains Pte Ltd [2009] EWHC 1940 (Comm) and PEC Ltd v Asia Golden Rice Co Ltd [2012] EWHC 846 (Comm). Both cases established that challenges to appeal awards run from the date of the appeal award itself, not from notification.
The judge clarified that section 70(3)'s reference to "any arbitral process of appeal or review" concerns the award being challenged. Where a first-tier award is appealed, the second limb of section 70(3) extends time pending that appeal's outcome. However, once the appeal award issues—with no further arbitral appeal available—only the first limb applies. Time runs from the appeal award's date.
This interpretation aligns with sections 67, 68 and 69, which all relate to awards containing the tribunal's reasons. It also serves the statutory purpose identified by the Departmental Advisory Committee: certainty, with the award date as "the only incontrovertible date from which the time period should run."
The court rejected the Claimant's argument that the prior appeal of the first-tier award somehow altered when time ran for challenging the appeal award. Where no arbitral process exists to review the appeal award, the second limb of section 70(3) has no application.
Extension of time refused
The Claimant alternatively sought an extension under section 80(5). Whilst the 15-day delay was attributable partly to sanctions-related payment difficulties, the court found the Claimant's legal advisers should have appreciated the true position. The leading textbooks cite UR Power GmbH and PEC Ltd, which ought to have alerted them to the risk. More than 13 years had passed since PEC Ltd, making the error difficult to excuse. The extension was refused, and the claim struck out.
The case reinforces that time limits in arbitration appeals must be strictly observed, with the award date providing certainty regardless of when parties receive it.