High Court clarifies legal aid costs recovery in civil contempt proceedings

McGivern case establishes precedent on indemnity principle application in criminal legal aid contexts
The High Court's recent judgement in Gillian McGivern v MBR Acres Limited & Ors [2025] EWHC 2070 has provided crucial clarification on costs recovery under criminal legal aid in civil contempt proceedings. The case addresses fundamental questions about the indemnity principle's application and its impact on access to justice.
Ms McGivern successfully defended civil contempt allegations relating to alleged breaches of an injunction order. The original proceedings were dismissed entirely, with the judge characterising the claims as "totally without merit". However, the subsequent costs assessment proved contentious, resulting in a substantial reduction from her claimed £120,292.21 to £20,673.34.
The central issue arose from Ms McGivern's legal representation arrangements. Initially secured through Scott Moncrieff & Associates Ltd under a criminal legal aid certificate, her application to instruct King's Counsel was declined by Mr Justice Nicklin, who deemed such representation unnecessary for what he considered a straightforward matter. Despite this refusal, Ms McGivern privately instructed King's Counsel and subsequently sought to recover costs reflecting the higher representation rates.
Ms McGivern's appeal challenged Costs Judge Whalan's decision of 18 July 2024, arguing that restricting recovery to criminal legal aid rates would undermine access to justice and create inequitable outcomes. She contended that statutory provisions permitted full recovery beyond the indemnity principle's traditional constraints, citing supporting case law to substantiate her position.
MBR Acres Limited countered that the indemnity principle must apply, restricting costs recovery to amounts prescribed by the Legal Aid Agency (LAA). They argued that extending recovery beyond LAA rates contravened established legal frameworks, particularly noting the absence of provisions equivalent to those available under civil legal aid that permit enhanced recovery.
The Honourable Mr Justice Sweeting upheld the lower court's decision, ruling that no legislative provisions existed to disapply the indemnity principle for criminal legal aid recipients in civil contempt cases. The judgement reinforced precedent established in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan, confirming that recoverable costs cannot exceed LAA liability.
This ruling establishes that criminal legal aid recipients in civil contempt proceedings face strict limitations on costs recovery, regardless of actual expenditure or case complexity. The indemnity principle's rigid application means that parties who choose enhanced representation beyond LAA provisions cannot recover the additional costs, even following complete vindication.
The case highlights significant tensions between statutory frameworks and practical access to justice. Where standard legal aid representation may prove inadequate for complex matters, litigants face difficult choices between accepting potentially insufficient representation or bearing substantial unrecoverable costs for appropriate counsel.
The judgement's broader implications extend beyond individual cost recovery to fundamental questions about legal aid policy effectiveness. The strict application of LAA rates may create disincentives for pursuing legitimate defences in contempt proceedings, particularly where cases involve complex legal or factual issues requiring specialist expertise.
Furthermore, the case demonstrates how costs frameworks can impact litigation strategy and settlement dynamics. The knowledge that enhanced representation costs remain unrecoverable may influence both the level of legal support sought and opponents' litigation conduct.
McGivern v MBR Acres thus represents a significant clarification of costs recovery principles whilst simultaneously highlighting systemic challenges within current legal aid provision. The judgement's emphasis on legislative limitations suggests that meaningful reform would require statutory intervention rather than judicial development of existing principles.