Eskander v GMC: filing an appeal without paying the fee does not make it out of time

The Court of Appeal has held that a doctor's statutory appeal against a Medical Practitioners Tribunal suspension was brought in time, despite her failure to pay the required £294 court fee when she filed her appellant's notice by email on the final day of the 28-day period.

Dr Amy Eskander, a Specialist Registrar in Neurology, had her registration suspended for 12 months following findings of dishonesty and misconduct. Acting in person with guidance from a direct access barrister, she emailed her appellant's notice to the Administrative Court Office (ACO) on 23 September 2025 — the last permissible day — but did not pay the issue fee. She had been advised to expect an automated payment link from the Court, which never arrived. She paid the fee in person on 17 October 2025, and the notice was sealed on 21 October.

Mansfield J struck out the appeal on the papers, holding it had not been validly commenced and declining to extend time. Dr Eskander appealed.

The Siniakovich principle and its application

The appeal turned principally on the recent decision in Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey [2026] EWCA Civ 215, handed down just three weeks before the hearing. In that case, Andrews LJ held that an action is "brought" for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 when the claim form is first delivered to the court office, regardless of whether the full fee has been paid. The Court of Appeal in Eskander was asked to apply that reasoning to a statutory appeal under s.40 of the Medical Act 1983.

The GMC advanced three grounds of distinction. First, that Siniakovich involved an underpayment whereas Dr Eskander had paid nothing. Second, that a statutory appeal differs from a civil action. Third, that she had filed by email, a method not permitted where a fee is payable.

Lord Justice Nugee, giving the leading judgement (with which Baker and Cobb LJJ agreed), rejected all three.

On the first, he held there is no logically defensible line between paying too little and paying nothing. The question is what the claimant has done — not how much they paid. To hold that payment of £1 suffices but payment of £0 does not would produce results that were "wholly implausible" as an expression of parliamentary intention, and would be "the very antithesis of a bright-line test."

On the second, he held that the word "brought" in the Medical Act should be construed consistently with the same word in the Limitation Act. Both serve the same function: defining a point at which a person has done enough to initiate proceedings within the relevant period. He noted that paragraph 10 of Schedule 4 to the Medical Act uses the term "brought" in precisely that sense, and there was no good reason for a divergent interpretation.

On the third, Practice Direction 5B confers a discretion on the Court to refuse an emailed application where a fee is payable — it does not mandate refusal. The ACO had not refused; it had engaged with the filing and ultimately sealed the notice. That discretion could not be revived post-issue.

Time extension: an alternative ground

Having allowed the appeal on the primary ground, the Court also considered whether time ought to have been extended under the Pomiechowski / Adesina line of authority. Where an absolute statutory time limit would impair the very essence of a litigant's Article 6 right of access to the courts, the court has a duty (not merely a discretion) to extend time, provided the litigant has personally done all they reasonably could to appeal in time.

The Court admitted fresh evidence — principally the email chain between Dr Eskander and her barrister, over which she had waived privilege — and found it apparently credible. She had raised the question of fee payment three times in writing and had been advised, wrongly, that the Court would send a payment link automatically. The surrogacy principle did not apply: her barrister was not conducting her litigation and she had filed her strike-out response herself.

In those circumstances, Dr Eskander had personally done all she reasonably could. Refusal to extend time would have impaired the very essence of her right of appeal, and the Court would have been bound to grant an extension.

The judgement confirms that the Siniakovich principle — originally articulated in the context of civil limitation periods — extends to statutory appeals. Delivery of the originating process to the court office in time is sufficient; administrative non-compliance with fee requirements, including total non-payment, does not prevent an appeal from being "brought." The Court acknowledged a residual lacuna in the Medical Act's sanction-activation scheme where a fee is never paid, suggesting the GMC could invite the Court to set a payment deadline and treat non-compliance as withdrawal.

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