Court rules on cycling funding legality

On June 10, 2025, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) delivered a significant judgement in the case of Transport Action Network Limited, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Transport [2025] EWCA Civ 702. This pivotal case revolved around the interpretation of Section 21 of the Infrastructure Act 2015, particularly addressing the lawful authority of the Secretary of State for Transport to amend funding provisions for an approved Cycling and Walking Investment Strategy (CWIS). The core issues were the legality of the Secretary of State's decision to reduce allocated funding and the statutory obligations imposed by the Act.

Transport Action Network Limited (TAN), the appellant, sought judicial review following a Ministerial Statement made on March 9, 2023, where the Secretary of State proposed to diminish the CWIS's funding by £200 million over its final two years. TAN argued that such a reduction contradicted the statutory requirements set forth in Section 21. This section stipulates that financial resources must be specified within the Strategy, highlighting the necessity for mandatory consultations and obligations in decisions surrounding public funds.

Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing, who presided over the case, began with an introduction that underscored the statutory provisions at play. The Infrastructure Act 2015 was enacted to provide a coherent funding strategy for active travel initiatives, addressing a historical lack of structured public funding. Part 2 of the Act concentrates specifically on cycling and walking strategies, outlining the Secretary of State's obligations to specify both objectives and the necessary financial resources to achieve those goals.

TAN contended that the Secretary acted unlawfully in proposing the budget cuts, while the Secretary's representatives asserted that Section 21 provided substantial discretionary authority. They maintained that the obligation to specify financial resources did not equate to a guarantee that these resources must always remain inflexible.

In examining the judgement, the court explored nuanced statutory interpretation, assessing whether “financial resources to be made available” indicated a duty or merely a target. Lady Justice Laing scrutinised the legislative intent and ultimately concluded that while the Secretary has the latitude to set and amend strategies, each change must preserve the integrity of the statutory provisions. This emphasised the necessity for thorough consultation when amending resource allocations.

In determining the outcome, the court resonated with TAN's interpretation, affirming that fundamental changes to stipulated financial commitments required adherence to established variation procedures. Consequently, the Secretary of State failed to demonstrate proper compliance with these requirements. This ruling reinforced the principles of public accountability concerning the management and distribution of public funds earmarked for active travel projects.

In summary, Lady Justice Laing highlighted the transformative role of statutory frameworks such as the Infrastructure Act in ensuring consistent policy measures to support cycling and walking initiatives. The appeal was allowed, thereby confirming TAN's stance regarding the Secretary's breach of statutory obligations. This decision is expected to have broader implications within public administration, influencing future discussions surrounding the governance of transportation funding and the responsibilities of public officials in England and Wales.

As stakeholder confidence and funding adequacy rise in public discourse, these judicial interpretations are poised to significantly affect the implementation and reform of future strategies, emphasising the importance of institutional transparency and accountability in achieving governmental cycling and walking objectives