Court fee errors do not delay the clock on litigation

Two Court of Appeal (CA) judgments coming in quick succession have clarified for the purposes of Statutory Appeals and the Limitation Act 1980, that an action is 'brought' on the date the claim form or appellant's notice is delivered to the court, even if the required court fee is not paid (whether in part or in full) on that same date. Providing that is, that the erroneous payment is a genuine error and not a deliberate act.

The First Case: Hassan-Soudey (aka Hamilton) and others v Siniakovich

In the first case - Hassan-Soudey [aka Hamilton) and others v Siniakovich [2026] EWCA Civ 215 ("Siniakovich") handed down on 4 March 2026, the CA held that for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 (and any other statute of limitations) the date an action was 'brought' was when the claim form was delivered to the court office, even if the court office subsequently and legitimately, refused to issue the claim because the requisite fee had not been paid at the same time.

In Siniakovich, Mr Siniakovich sought to bring a claim for defamation, malicious falsehood and certain other torts. On the day before the relevant limitation period expired, his solicitors filed the claim form and particulars of claim by CE file. They also made payment of a fee. Eleven days later, and thereby after the limitation period had expired, the court office notified his solicitors that the filing had been rejected because not all appropriate fees had been paid. The requested additional fee was promptly paid and the claim form and particulars of claim resubmitted, following which, the claim form was sealed and issued by the Court.

The Key Question on Appeal

The key question on appeal was:

"whether a failure to pay the correct fee at the time when the claim form was received in the court office means that the action has not been "brought" on that date for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 (and any other statute of limitations". (Andrews LJ, [37].)

The CA concluded the answer to this question was No.

In reaching this conclusion Andrews LJ [120] drew a clear distinction between missing a deadline for filing, which in her opinion was "generally inexcusable" and making an honest mistake in the payment of fees "which can easily occur.". She noted that in the case before her, there had been an inadvertent error and observed that there was also "plenty of scope for a litigant in person to make an error of this nature.". She went on to confirm [122] however, that the case before her was quite different to one where there was evidence of deliberate underpayment to gain a procedural advantage, in which case the court would have appropriate sanctions available to it, including the ability to strike out the claim.

The Second Case: Eskander v General Medical Council

In the second case - Eskander v General Medical Council [2026] EWCA Civ 372 ("Eskander") handed down on 31 March 2026, Dr Eskander had been subject to professional disciplinary proceedings brought by the General Medical Council ("GMC"). In August 2025, a Tribunal of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service ("MPTS") found her fitness to practise was impaired and determined she should be suspended for a period of 12months.

Under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983, Dr Eskander had a right to bring an appeal to the High Court, providing that such appeal be 'brought' within 28 days of the date of the Tribunal's decision.

Dr Eskander, sought advice on her appeal from an experienced direct access barrister. On the last day of the appeal window, she submitted her appellant's notice by email to the Administrative Court Office ("ACO"). Based on the advice she had received, she expected to receive a separate payment link in order to pay the required court fee. No such link was provided.

In October 2025, Dr Eskander was informed by the ACO that the requisite fee needed to be paid. She promptly attended the Court and made payment, following which the appellant's notice was sealed and issued by the Court.

The GMC then applied for Dr Eskander's appeal to be struck out on the grounds that it had not been brought within the requisite 28-day period. In response, Dr Eskander made an application to extend the time for presenting her appeal, but did not at this stage waive privilege in the advice she had received regarding the expected process for payment of the fee.

Dr Eskander's Grounds of Appeal

The matter was considered on the papers and Dr Eskander's application was rejected on the basis that her failure to pay the requisite fee at the time she submitted the appellant's notice meant that she had not brought her appeal in time, and it was not appropriate to extend time. Her appeal was thereby struck out.

Dr Eskander appealed against the strike out and also applied to introduce new evidence, electing to waive privilege in the legal advice she had received in order to evidence why she had not paid the fee on the same date as she filed her appellant's notice.

Prior to Siniakovich, it had been common ground between the parties that the court at first instance had been right to hold that the appeal had not been brought in time, as no fee had been paid when the appellant's notice was filed with the court (following Rakoczy v GMC [2022] EWHC 890 (Admin) and Gupta v GMC [2020] EWHC 38 (Admin)).

Initially therefore, Dr Eskander relied on three grounds of appeal: 1) that she had new evidence to show that she had in fact done all she could to pay the requisite fee at the time she filed her appeal, and had relied on the mis-advice of counsel in respect of how she should pay the fee; 2) in the alternative, if counsel's advice was correct, the hurdles that a litigant in person would need to overcome in order to pay the requisite fee were almost insurmountable and therefore it was necessary for time to be extended under Article 6, ECHR; 3) logically either ground 1 or 2 was correct, and either way, she had therefore personally done all that she could to have brought her appeal within the time and the time limit should (must) therefore be extended.

The Impact of Siniakovich and the Court of Appeal's Conclusion

Fortunately for Dr Eskander, judgment was handed down in Siniakovich just before her appeal was due to be heard. In light of Siniakovich, Dr Eskander applied for and was granted permission to amend her grounds of appeal and add a fourth ground – namely that based on Siniakovich the court at first instance had erred in finding that her appeal had not been brought in time merely because it had not been accompanied by the requisite fee.

The CA accepted Ground 4 and allowed Dr Eskander's appeal. In doing so it held that, analogous with Siniakovich, a statutory appeal is 'brought' when the appellant's notice is delivered to the court office, even if it is not accompanied by the requisite court fee. The decisive action being the filing of the appellants notice, not the timing of the payment of the fee.

In reaching its conclusion, the CA rejected the argument that statutory appeals should be treated differently from actions under the Limitations Act 1980, making clear that the question of when an action is 'brought' must be answered consistently across different statutory contexts. The CA also rejected the argument that non-payment should be treated differently from underpayment.