On March 20, the Court of Appeal handed down a significant judgment in Re J (Loss of Parental Responsibility) [2026] EWCA Civ 344. The joint appeals addressed a long-standing area of uncertainty in family law: whether a father recorded as a child’s “father” on a birth certificate automatically acquires parental responsibility when they are not, in fact, the child’s biological father.
The judgment has practical consequences for advising, case management, and litigation strategy for practitioners moving forward.
Background to the appeals
The Court of Appeal heard three appeals, each concerning men who were named as a tor could not be established:
- Re J – the appellant believed he was the child’s biological father at the time of registration. DNA testing later showed this was incorrect.
- Re M – the appellant knowingly used donor sperm outside a licensed clinic and was registered as the child’s father despite not being biologically related.
- Re P – the mother had sexual intercourse with identical twins. DNA testing confirmed one twin was the father, but it was impossible to prove which twin. One twin was named on the birth certificate.
In each case, the central question was whether the registration as “father” was enough to confer parental responsibility under section 4 of the Children Act 1989 and if so, whether that responsibility continued unless removed by court order.
The Court identified and answered four core questions:
- Is “father” under the Children Act 1989 limited to the biological (genetic) father?
- Does registration as a “father” automatically confer parental responsibility?
- If parental responsibility arises, does it end automatically following a declaration of non‑paternity?
- Is the child’s welfare paramount when deciding whether parental responsibility should be removed?
The Court of Appeal’s decision and what this means in practice
The term “father” in the Children Act 1989 has its common law meaning: the child’s biological or genetic father, unless statute expressly provides otherwise (for example, adoption or assisted reproduction under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act).
Psychological or social parenting, while highly relevant to welfare decisions, does not amount to legal fatherhood for the purposes of parental responsibility under section 4.
It has been common for practitioners, local authorities and even courts to proceed on the basis that a named father automatically holds PR. Following Re J, that assumption can no longer safely be made.
If there is any doubt as to who the putative father is, practitioners should verify the legal basis of parental responsibility at the outset of every case. . In such cases, early consideration should be given to DNA testing where parental responsibility status is likely to be material to the proceedings. It will also be best practice to ensure that the client file clearly records the precise basis upon which parental responsibility is said to arise, rather than relying on birth registration alone.
Being named as a “father” on a birth certificate does not, by itself, confer parental responsibility unless both of the following are satisfied:
- the person is the child’s biological father; and
- the person is registered as a “father” on the birth certificate.
If the person is not the biological father, parental responsibility never arises, even if everyone believed at the time that it did.
Practitioners should be encouraged to reassess, at an early stage, who should properly be served and involved in proceedings. Where a registered “father” is not the biological father, he may not hold parental responsibility and, as a result, may not need to be served as a respondent in public law proceedings.
However, the absence of parental responsibility does not necessarily mean that the individual should be excluded from proceedings altogether. Where the individual has played a significant role in the child’s life, he may still need to be involved as a relevant person or as a de facto carer. This will be particularly important in cases where his relationship with the child is likely to be relevant to welfare determinations.
Clearly, practitioners need to draw a clear distinction between legal status and welfare relevance. Parental responsibility is a question of legal status, whereas the individual’s relationship with the child goes to welfare. The two concepts should not be blurred, and careful thought must be given to each when determining the appropriate parties to proceedings.
No need for an order to “remove” parental responsibility
Where a person is wrongly registered as a father and is later found not to be the biological father, parental responsibility is not “lost” or “terminated”. Instead, the Court confirmed that it never existed in law. As a result, no order under section 4(2A) is required (save for exceptional cases such as Re P, where clarity is needed due to evidential uncertainty).
In disputed parentage, orders under section 4(2A) of the Children Act 1989 for the termination of parental responsibility, are commonly sought. Following Re J, this approach will require reconsideration because where an individual is not the biological father, there is no parental responsibility to remove, as it will not have arisen in law.
The strategic focus should instead shift towards obtaining appropriate declaratory or procedural clarity. In particular, practitioners should consider seeking declarations of non-parentage or inviting the court to resolve the issue through case management directions where the position is uncertain or disputed.
Further practical implications
This judgment has wide ranging consequences for family law practice:
- Clarity for practitioners – confirms that parental responsibility under section 4 depends on biological fatherhood, not paperwork or intention.
- Psychological parents – individuals who are not biological parents must seek parental responsibility via alternative routes, such as:
- Child Arrangements Orders under section 8; and
- parental responsibility under section 12 of the Children Act 1989.
- International cases – the Court acknowledged potential gaps in child abduction cases where parental responsibility was assumed but never legally held. In urgent situations, consideration should be given to applying for without notice prohibited steps orders or child arrangements orders which confer parental responsibility, in order to ensure that the child’s position is protected without relying on uncertain legal status.
- Birth registration – The judgment also emphasises the need for greater scrutiny at the point of birth registration. This is because a birth certificate is not determinative of legal parenthood for the purposes of parental responsibility.
Practitioners should manage client expectations carefully in light of Re J, as clients who have acted as a child’s parent in every practical sense may nevertheless find that they do not hold parental responsibility. Where parental responsibility is not properly regularised, clients may be excluded from important decision-making processes concerning the child and may be unable to challenge key welfare decisions through the court. Therefore, proactive steps to secure parental responsibility through the appropriate legal routes are essential.
More broadly, practitioners should avoid relying solely on the presence of a birth certificate when advising clients on issues such as consent to travel or the risk of child abduction. Instead, the underlying legal basis of any claimed parental responsibility must be carefully analysed before advice is given or action is taken.
The practical consequence is that practitioners must advise clients that registration as a “father” carries limited legal effect where there is no biological connection.
This issue is likely to arise most acutely in cases involving informal donor arrangements and co-parenting agreements outside regulated frameworks. In such situations, clients may proceed on the basis of shared intention or informal agreement, without appreciating that these factors do not confer legal status. Early, clear advice is therefore essential to ensure that parental responsibility is properly secured through the appropriate legal mechanisms.
Conclusion
Re J is not merely a clarification of the law; it necessitates a shift in routine practice for family lawyers. Practitioners must now treat parental responsibility as a fact-sensitive issue which requires careful verification in every case, rather than relying on assumptions derived from birth registration alone.
It will be essential to incorporate early analysis of paternity into case strategy, particularly where parental responsibility is likely to be contested or determinative of the parties’ rights.
In urgent cases, greater reliance should be placed on protective orders to secure the child’s position, rather than assuming that an individual holds parental responsibility. At the same time, clients who are not biological parents must be advised, without delay, to regularise their legal position through the appropriate statutory mechanisms where they wish to retain a decision-making role in the child’s life.
Ultimately, the decision removes a long-standing legal fiction. The practical challenge for family lawyers is to ensure that case preparation, client advice and litigation strategy are aligned with this clarified legal reality from the outset.
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