Collardeau v Fuchs: Service requirements and contempt proceedings in family court

Family Court examines service of injunctions and retrospective waiver of procedural defects
The Family Court has clarified important procedural requirements for contempt applications, particularly regarding service of injunctive orders, in proceedings where Mr Justice Poole found Michael Fuchs in contempt for breaching a preservation order.
The case arose from enforcement proceedings following a financial remedy order made by Mostyn J in June 2023. Poole J's order of 28 March 2025 included a preservation injunction prohibiting Fuchs from selling or dealing with certain US properties, and a provision preventing him from impeding domestication of court orders abroad. Fuchs subsequently sold a property known as ML1 on 25 June 2025 and filed affirmations opposing the applicant's US domestication application.
Whilst Fuchs admitted breaching the orders, he contested liability for contempt on two grounds: insufficient service of the March order and that the anti-impediment provision was ultra vires.
Service of injunctive orders
The central issue concerned whether email service under an alternative service order satisfied requirements for contempt proceedings. Fuchs had not been served personally with the injunction, but Knowles J had previously ordered that email service to his business address would constitute good service for all documents in the proceedings.
Fuchs relied heavily on Ahmed v Khan, where Mostyn J held that alternative service orders must expressly state on their face that personal service is waived for contempt proceedings. Poole J declined to follow this approach, finding it inconsistent with the Family Procedure Rules and Court of Appeal authority.
Drawing on MBR Acres v Maher, Poole J held that FPR Part 37 does not mandate personal service of injunctive orders. Where alternative service has been ordered under FPR r6.19, the court has dispensed with personal service. The alternative service order applied to all documents in the proceedings and remained in force when the injunction was made.
Poole J emphasised that Fuchs had attended the hearing remotely when the preservation order was made, the issue was discussed with him, and he continued using the email address after the alternative service order. No prejudice resulted from email service.
Retrospective waiver of defects
Even if the alternative service order proved ineffective, Poole J held that the court retained power to waive procedural defects retrospectively under FPR PD37A para (2), which permits waiver of defects in contempt applications where no injustice is caused.
This power survived the 2020 rule changes despite removal of the express provision in former FPR r37.8. Court of Appeal decisions in Popat v Khawaja and Davy International v Tazzyman establish that failure to serve an injunctive order constitutes a procedural defect in contempt proceedings that may be waived retrospectively.
The key question is whether material terms of the injunction were effectively communicated to the defendant to the criminal standard. Fuchs was present when the order was made, discussed the preservation order with the judge, and admitted in evidence that he understood he had disobeyed the court's prohibition on selling ML1.
Ultra vires provision
Poole J accepted that paragraph 10 of his order, prohibiting impediment of domestication proceedings, was too widely drawn. It effectively prevented Fuchs from relying on legal rights in foreign courts without qualification for lawful cause. Following Deutsche Bank v Highland Crusader, such doubts about an order's ambit should be resolved favourably to the defendant in contempt proceedings.
The court found Fuchs guilty of contempt for selling ML1 in breach of the preservation order but not for breaching the anti-impediment provision. Sentencing was adjourned pending clarification of substantial payments Fuchs had made towards satisfying the underlying financial remedy order.
