Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police challenges misconduct panel's refusal to dismiss inspector

The High Court has dismissed a judicial review brought by the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police challenging a misconduct panel's decision to impose a final written warning rather than dismiss an inspector who engaged in sexual activity with a subordinate PCSO on police premises whilst on duty.

In Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v Police Misconduct Panel [2025] EWHC 3018 (Admin), Mr Justice Swift upheld the panel's decision despite the Chief Constable's argument that dismissal was the only appropriate sanction for conduct amounting to gross misconduct.

Inspector Alex Taylor had engaged in a brief relationship with a PCSO under his indirect line management in early 2020. The relationship included exchanging sexual messages and culminated in a single sexual encounter on police premises on 20 April 2020, whilst Inspector Taylor was on duty. Following the breakdown of the relationship, the matter came to light when the distressed PCSO confided in colleagues.

The Police Misconduct Panel found that Inspector Taylor had breached three Standards of Professional Behaviour: Authority, Respect and Courtesy; Duties and Responsibilities; and Discreditable Conduct. The panel determined this amounted to gross misconduct but imposed a final written warning for four years rather than dismissal.

Grounds of challenge

The Chief Constable advanced six grounds of challenge, arguing the panel's decision was Wednesbury unreasonable. These included contentions that there was insufficient evidence that Inspector Taylor's mental health diminished the seriousness of his misconduct, that the panel misevaluated culpability and harm, failed adequately to analyse aggravating and mitigating factors, and incorrectly described features of the case as "exceptional" when they were not.

The court's approach

Mr Justice Swift emphasised the substantial deference owed to misconduct panels' expertise in assessing what sanctions are necessary to maintain public confidence in policing. Drawing on Salter v Chief Constable of Dorset [2012] EWCA Civ 1047 and R(O'Connor) v Panel Chair, Police Misconduct Panel [2025] ICR 1137, the judge noted that panels occupy a position comparable to professional regulatory bodies whose sanction decisions attract considerable judicial respect.

The court found the panel was entitled to rely on psychiatric evidence that Inspector Taylor's decision-making had been impaired by major depressive disorder and discontinuation of anti-depressant medication. This properly informed the assessment of culpability, which the panel placed at a "medium level" within the context of gross misconduct.

The panel had appropriately considered that whilst the sexual encounter on duty at police premises was serious, the relationship was consensual and did not involve abuse of authority or sexual predation as envisaged by the College of Policing's Relationships Guidance. The panel reasonably concluded the harm caused fell within the "medium to high" range, rejecting the Chief Constable's characterisation that the working environment had become "toxic"—an allegation the court noted was unsupported by evidence and "a gross exaggeration".

Application of guidance

The judgement confirmed that the duty to "have regard" to College of Policing guidance does not mandate any particular structured approach or specific outcome. Panels must consider the substance of such guidance whilst exercising discretion based on each case's particular facts. The panel had properly applied the three-stage approach from Fuglers v SRA [2014] EWHC 179, assessing seriousness, considering the purpose of sanctions, and selecting an appropriate sanction.

The court concluded that the panel's decision, including its assessment that an informed member of the public would view the sanction as fulfilling the misconduct regime's purposes, fell within the range of decisions reasonably open to it.

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