CGT v West Sussex: Court clarifies disability care funding and double recovery principles

The High Court has quashed a local authority's refusal to fund care for a severely disabled man, confirming that personal injury compensation held in trust cannot be considered when assessing eligibility for statutory care funding, even where undertakings were previously given not to seek such funding.

CGT suffered catastrophic brain injuries as an infant, resulting in severe cognitive impairment, visual impairment, and epilepsy requiring lifelong care and support. In 2012, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority awarded over £3.5 million to a discretionary trust, including £2.6 million for future care costs. CGT's mother, appointed as his Deputy by the Court of Protection, gave undertakings that she would not apply for public funding without court approval confirming the trust funds were insufficient.

Following the mother's death in 2013, CGT's father was appointed Deputy without any such restriction. In 2019, he requested West Sussex County Council assess CGT's care needs and contribute to residential care costs. The council began discretionary payments in July 2020 but simultaneously applied to the Court of Protection to impose restrictions on the Deputy's authority. The Court of Protection dismissed this application in October 2023.

In June 2024, the council ceased funding and demanded repayment of £271,253.44, arguing that continuing payments would constitute double recovery since CGT had already received compensation for care costs.

The court's analysis

His Honour Judge Auerbach comprehensively rejected the council's position. The Care and Support (Charging and Assessment of Resources) Regulations 2014 require local authorities to disregard capital held in personal injury trusts when assessing resources. Paragraph 15 of Schedule 2 incorporates the Income Support Regulations' provision that trust funds "derived from a payment made in consequence of any personal injury" must be wholly disregarded.

The council argued this provision should be interpreted to exclude care-related compensation, aligning with paragraph 16 which explicitly excludes payments "specifically identified by a court to deal with the cost of providing care" from ordinary personal injury awards. The judge found this argument "unsustainable". The statutory language was "clear, unambiguous and unqualified", leaving no room for interpretation. Parliament had deliberately treated trust funds differently from direct payments, being alive to this distinction when drafting adjacent provisions.

The council's alternative argument, drawing on Welwyn Hatfield BC v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, suggested the court should prevent the Deputy from benefitting by resiling from his predecessor's undertakings. Judge Auerbach distinguished that case, noting it involved deliberate deception practised on the enforcing authority itself—circumstances wholly absent here.

Double recovery and discretionary relief

The council's final position rested on preventing double recovery, citing authorities including Peters v East Midland Strategic Health Authority and Tinsley v Manchester City Council. Judge Auerbach clarified that the double recovery principle operates when courts assess damages in tort proceedings, not when local authorities discharge statutory duties.

In Tinsley, the Court of Appeal emphasised that undertakings in Peters were designed to protect tortfeasors, not local authorities. As Longmore LJ observed, the Court of Protection's function is protecting patients' interests, not determining substantive rights against third parties. The proper forum for addressing double recovery is "the court considering the damages claim", not the Administrative Court reviewing local authority decisions.

The judge rejected the council's invitation to refuse relief as a discretionary matter. The council's position amounted to relitigating arguments already rejected at the liability stage. Unlike resource-based challenges to statutory duties, this case involved no exceptional circumstances warranting the court's indulgence.

The council was ordered to pay £66,979.15 to the trust, representing care costs paid following its unlawful decision, and to meet the claimant's costs on the standard basis.

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