Buzzard-Quashie v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire: contempt and police disclosure failures

Court of Appeal clarifies contempt requirements following police disclosure failures and false evidence
The Court of Appeal has overturned a county court decision and found the Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police in contempt, establishing important principles about court order compliance and civil contempt proceedings. The case arose from a four-year struggle by Ms Buzzard-Quashie to obtain body-worn video footage of her arrest in September 2021.
Following her arrest, Ms Buzzard-Quashie immediately sought preservation of the BWV footage, believing she had been wrongfully arrested and physically assaulted. Despite an Information Commissioner's Office decision in April 2022 ordering disclosure, the police failed to produce all footage. Ms Buzzard-Quashie subsequently obtained a court order on 25 April 2023 requiring disclosure of all footage and a witness statement from an officer of at least inspector rank explaining any unavailable material within 28 days.
The Chief Constable failed to comply. No witness statement was produced by the deadline, and when one eventually materialised six months later, it came from a civilian data protection officer. Throughout proceedings, the police maintained that all existing footage had been disclosed. This claim proved entirely false when, days before the Court of Appeal hearing, further footage was discovered after Ms Elves (appearing pro bono) meticulously examined audit logs.
At first instance, Her Honour Judge Genn refused to find contempt despite acknowledging the order had been breached. She concluded that three "impediments" prevented a contempt finding: the absence of a penal notice on the order; the Chief Constable's lack of personal involvement; and the absence of deliberate or wilful conduct.
Lord Justice Fraser, giving the leading judgement with which Lord Justice Coulson and Lady Justice Asplin agreed, systematically dismantled each purported impediment. On the nature of breach required, the Court affirmed the principles from Cuciurean v Secretary of State for Transport and İşbilen v Turk: civil contempt requires proof that the defendant, knowing of the order, deliberately performed an act that objectively breached it. No intention to commit contempt or interfere with justice administration is required—such matters relate to sanction, not liability.
Regarding personal responsibility, the Court held that under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, the Chief Constable is a corporation sole with direction and control over the police force. Acts and omissions by force members are therefore his responsibility, following the reasoning in M v Home Office concerning ministerial responsibility for departmental acts.
On penal notices, the Court clarified that these are relevant to committal sanctions, not contempt findings themselves. There are not two tiers of court orders—those with and without penal notices. Orders made against public bodies, including police forces, must be obeyed regardless of penal notice presence.
The judgement emphasises that finding contempt serves to vindicate the rule of law, particularly against public bodies. As Lord Woolf stated in M v Home Office, such findings have significance beyond punishment—they uphold justice administration even where imprisonment or fines are inappropriate.
The appeal succeeded on all six grounds. The Chief Constable admitted contempt and apologised, referring the matter to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The case awaits further hearings to determine appropriate sanctions for the admitted contempt, which included not merely non-compliance with the April 2023 order but lodging factually inaccurate witness statements with both courts.
The judgement represents a significant clarification of civil contempt requirements and reinforces that court order compliance cannot be treated as optional, regardless of penal notice presence or claimed administrative oversight.
