Brightwaters Energy v Eroton: English court appoints receivers to enforce Nigerian judgement

The High Court grants a receivership order over Nigerian oil revenues, finding sufficient English law connexion despite complex cross-border enforcement obstacles.
In Brightwaters Energy Limited v Eroton Exploration and Production Company Limited [2026] EWHC 296 (Comm), Mr Justice Butcher granted a receivership order appointing Grant Thornton partners as receivers over oil revenues owed to a Nigerian energy company — a significant decision on the reach of equitable execution in cross-border enforcement.
The underlying Nigerian judgement, entered by consent in Lagos in June 2022, held Eroton and Energy Link Infrastructure Ltd jointly and severally liable to pay US$25.15 million to Brightwaters. Following partial payments, over US$16.6 million remained outstanding. Nigerian insolvency proceedings stalled after Eroton obtained a stay pending appeal, and parallel attempts to recover the balance through San Leon Energy proved fruitless. Brightwaters accordingly sought enforcement through the English courts, having registered the Nigerian judgement under s.9 of the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and identified a contract between Eroton and a Shell entity — believed to be governed by English law with London-seated arbitration — under which Shell was receiving 32,000 barrels of oil per day from the Nigerian oilfield OML18.
The court's jurisdiction to appoint receivers by way of equitable execution under s.37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 was not seriously contested. Butcher J applied the principles set out in Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Ltd [2014] EWHC 3131 (Comm), asking whether there was a real prospect the appointment would assist enforcement, a hindrance to ordinary execution processes, and a sufficient connexion with England. All three were satisfied: the Shell contract's English situs and governing law provided the jurisdictional anchor, the stalled Lagos proceedings demonstrated the enforcement difficulty, and the scale of the outstanding sum comfortably outweighed the likely receivership costs.
Eroton resisted on several grounds. It argued that an All Assets Debenture in favour of Guaranty Trust Bank, securing approximately US$147 million, meant there was no reachable asset and any receivership would be fruitless. Butcher J rejected this, noting the Oil Revenues already sat under a fixed charge without disrupting Eroton's trading, and finding at least a reasonable prospect that GT Bank's debt could be repaid — particularly given reported refinancing efforts — after which the receivership would become operative. Crucially, the court declined to resolve hypothetical questions about future effectiveness, consistent with the principle that equity does not require certainty of outcome before acting.
The argument that Brightwaters had irrevocably elected a class remedy by filing the Nigerian winding-up petition was dismissed as unattractive given that Eroton had itself engineered the stay of those proceedings, partly on the ground that Brightwaters had not pursued individual enforcement. Comity concerns also failed: the English receivership was directed at an English-law asset and, in substance, assisted in enforcing a Nigerian judgement.
A notable procedural incident arose when Eroton's counsel cited Williams v Gateley & Others [2014] EWHC 2839 (Ch) in support of a requirement to notify GT Bank. Butcher J confirmed the case did not exist, having been produced by AI without verification — a pointed illustration of the risks of unchecked AI-assisted research. The actual authority cited, Wilson v Emmott [2020] EWHC 3936 (Comm), disclosed no general rule requiring notification of charge-holders, and the court found no procedural irregularity, though the order would require GT Bank to receive notice and be afforded standing to apply for variation.
On disclosure, Brightwaters' failure to refer explicitly to the registered charges before Robin Knowles J on the without-notice hearing was criticised but found non-material. The evidence had alluded to other creditors, the draft order itself contemplated security interests, and the initial order was deliberately limited pending a return date inter partes.
The receivership order was granted accordingly.
