Attorney General v Dr Christian Mallon: indefinite restriction of proceedings order imposed for vexatious employment tribunal claims

The Employment Appeal Tribunal has imposed an indefinite Restriction of Proceedings Order (RPO) against Dr Christian Mallon following a sustained pattern of vexatious litigation spanning nearly a decade. In The Attorney General v Dr Christian Mallon [2025] EAT 168, Mr Justice Griffiths determined that Dr Mallon had habitually and persistently instituted proceedings without reasonable ground, warranting the protective measure under section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.

Pattern of vexatious proceedings

Dr Mallon, who holds qualifications including a PhD in Chemical Engineering and an Executive MBA, made between 60 and 70 discrimination claims against potential employers across Employment Tribunals throughout England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The claimant suffers from dyspraxia, autism, ADHD, and Crohn's disease, and typically applied for roles in high volume before bringing disability discrimination claims when unsuccessful.

Almost all claims were dismissed, withdrawn, or struck out for having no reasonable prospects of success. Costs orders totalling tens of thousands of pounds were made against Dr Mallon in seven separate cases. Employment Tribunals repeatedly found his claims misconceived, with one tribunal concluding in Mallon v Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy that his claims were "fundamentally dishonest" and designed to secure settlements rather than genuine remedies.

The sole partial success came against his former employer Aecom Ltd, where he was awarded £2,000 for injury to feelings in a reasonable adjustments claim. However, liability findings were subsequently partially overturned on appeal, with the matter remitted for reconsideration.

Legal framework and Article 6 considerations

Section 33 requires the Appeal Tribunal to be satisfied that a person has "habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground" instituted vexatious proceedings before imposing an RPO. The order operates as a filter requiring tribunal permission before new proceedings may be commenced or continued.

Mr Justice Griffiths rejected Dr Mallon's argument that an RPO would violate his Article 6 ECHR rights. Following established authorities including Williamson v Bishop of London [2023] 1 WLR 2472 and AG v Covey [2001] EWCA Civ 254, the court held that RPOs pursue legitimate aims and maintain proportionality by protecting both tribunal resources and respondents from abuse whilst preserving access to justice for meritorious claims.

The judgement emphasised that RPOs function as filters rather than barriers. Claims with merit proceed following permission; those constituting abuse or lacking reasonable grounds do not. The court noted that tribunals' limited resources should not be "squandered" on vexatious litigation, whilst respondents deserve protection from the stress and expense of defending groundless allegations.

Indefinite duration

Dr Mallon proposed a voluntary filtering mechanism lasting 2-5 years as an alternative. The court rejected this, finding no evidence of changed behaviour or genuine reflection. Following AG v McCluskey (2009) UKEAT/0118/09/RN, an indefinite order was imposed given the absence of any indication Dr Mallon would cease bringing vexatious claims.

The decision underscores tribunals' willingness to use statutory powers to protect the system's integrity whilst ensuring meritorious disability discrimination claims can still proceed. At the time of the order, 17 appeals remained stayed pending the RPO application's outcome.

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