A retailer had infringed a flower delivery network's trade marks under Directive 89/104 art.5(1)(a) and Regulation 40/94 art.9(1)(a) by using variations of "Interflora" as keywords on the Google AdWords referencing service. Use of the signs had an adverse effect on the origin function of the trade marks because a significant proportion of the consumers who searched for those signs were led to believe, incorrectly, that the retailer's flower delivery service was part of the competing network.
A former employee was not liable for breach of confidence related to the misuse of confidential information as she had not had actual or objective knowledge of the confidential information in question either during her employment or afterwards. To hold her liable would be inconsistent with legal principle and with maintaining the balance between effectively protecting intellectual property rights and not unreasonably inhibiting competition in the market place.
A public right of access conferred on residents of a district and neighbourhood could survive the extinction of rights of common which were exercisable on the common land over which the public right of access existed. Such public rights were not to be extinguished save by clear words or inescapable implication.
Unless some special arrangement was made with a particular minister, the rights and duties of ministers of the Methodist Church arose entirely from their status in the constitution of the Church and not from any contract; accordingly, the respondent, a former minister, had not been an employee of the Church and had not been entitled to bring a claim for unfair dismissal against it.
Where a successful claimant term-inated his retainer with his solicitors at the conclusion of his case and negotiated costs in person with the defendant, accepting a costs payment which was significantly less than the costs actually incurred by his solicitors, the court would intervene to protect the solicitor's claim if the defendant was on notice of the claim. The solicitors should have applied, in the compromised proceedings, for the costs to be paid into court to await allocation by the court.
A prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence whose detention was prolonged by the Parole Board's delay in reviewing his case following the expiry of his tariff was not the victim of either false imprisonment or a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 art.5(1).
Nevertheless, damages were ordinarily to be awarded for such delay where it was established that an earlier hearing would have resulted in an earlier release. Where that was not established, modest damages were to be awarded where the delay had caused sufficiently serious frustration and anxiety.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYIn deciding that a manufacturer had not infringed a patent for a range of capsule-based coffee machines by producing capsules compatible with the machines, the court considered the interpretation and application of the phrases "means relating to an essential element of the invention" and "staple commercial products" in the Patents Act 1977 s.60.<
The appellant failed to show that the death of her daughter while on a school trip on Dartmoor was the result of the negligence of a teacher who had lost her way and failed to meet the team at a checkpoint.
A judge had not erred in finding that a further screening opinion under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations 1999 was unnecessary following an amendment to an application for planning permission for a renewable energy plant which involved the relocation of an associated proposed heat and power plant from its original adjoining rural site to an industrial site.
In complex cross-litigation involving a number of parties, the court considered whether the threshold had been passed for granting one party permission to bring contempt proceedings against the others, and whether such proceedings were in the public interest and proportionate.
A prohibition order with a two-year minimum review imposed on a teacher was appropriate and not disproportionate where, in response to questions asked by his students, he had made comments about his Christian beliefs on homosexuality and church attendance on Sundays. His lack of insight into the inappropriateness of the comments meant that it was likely the events would be repeated and justified the imposition of the order.
The appellant teacher (H) appealed against a prohibition order with a two-year minimum review imposed in accordance with the recommendation made by the respondent council's professional conduct committee.
A master was entitled to find that an individual had been knowingly involved in a dishonest transaction connected with mortgage fraud, and that the individual could not show that monies which he had received belonged to him and not to a building society who had been the victim of the fraud.
The funding of disbursements in a personal injury action by a claimants solicitor did not render the solicitor a real party to the action, nor did it justify a conclusion that the solicitor had stepped outside his normal role. A judge had therefore been wrong to order for full disclosure of a claimants funding arrangements to enable the defendant to seek a costs order against the solicitor.
In dividing the value of shares held by a couple in a company founded by the husband during their marriage, which would be sold some years after their separation, the court took account of the husband’s continued work for the company following the separation. The value of the shares when they were sold would, in part, be the product of the husband’s sole endeavours and would therefore, in part, not be marital property.
 EWHC 506 (Fam)
Fam Div - Moylan J
13 March 2013
The applicant wife (W) applied for a financial order in connection with her divorce from the respondent husband (H).
H had founded a company early in the marriage. The couple’s shares in the company were estimated to be worth £32 million, but they could not be sold for two to three years. The couple had loaned money to the company and were receiving repayments from it. H continued to work for the company following the parties’ separation. The court had to determine how the parties’ resources should be divided, including whether property should be added back in W’s favour on the basis that H had been wantonly spending money; whether H had made a special contribution to the marriage such as to justify dividing the shares in his favour; and whether his post-separation endeavour justified dividing the shares in his favour. The court also had to determine whether H should pay W maintenance for herself and whether trusts held on behalf of the parties’ children should be used for their maintenance.
HELD: (1) The parties’ total assets, apart from the shares, were worth £8.7 million. H’s net earned annual income was taken as £280,000; he would also receive half the loan interest of £110,000 net and rental and utilities payments from the company until at least 2014. H’s current wife’s income was also taken into account. W’s only income in the near future would be what she received from her capital resources: her income from the loan would provide her with £105,000 net annually. The level and nature of housing which the parties could obtain in the immediate future was limited by the resources available until the sale of the shares. However, if the resources were available, it would be reasonable for each party to purchase accommodation costing around £3 million. Given the family’s standard of living, the parties would be able to justify an income needs schedule of £300,000, although the level at which they could meet those needs was also limited by the resources available until the share sale (see paras 83-89, 100-101 of judgment). (2) The question of add-back depended on what both parties had been spending: it was insufficient merely to point to certain aspects of H’s expenditure. Both parties’ expenditure had been, to a large extent, funded from capital. There had to be clear evidence of wanton dissipation which it would be inequitable to disregard, Vaughan v Vaughan  EWCA Civ 1085,  1 F.L.R. 1108 followed. H’s level of expenditure had been very high. There was no clear picture of W’s expenditure; however, the evidence suggested that she had also been spending at a significant rate. W had only partly established the evidential foundation for a notional reattribution. It was not possible to carry out a proper comparison to determine whether H’s expenditure had been wanton. Further, the notional reattribution involved around 1-2 per cent of the total wealth: that degree of adjustment was not necessary in order to achieve a fair result (paras 105-114). (3) The question of a special contribution did not depend on any detailed analysis of contributions. It required a striking evidential foundation which so clearly stood out that the question almost answered itself. H had accepted in his evidence that he considered that an equal division of the shares would have been fair up until the end of the marriage: in that case, it was difficult for the court to conclude that there had been such disparity in the parties’ contributions that it would be inequitable to disregard it, Lambert v Lambert  EWCA Civ 1685,  Fam. 103 applied (paras 132-134). (4) The issue of post-separation endeavour involved considering what was meant by marital property and then addressing the manner in which the sharing principle was applied. The shares had been generated during the marriage, but their value could not be realised until some years after its end. That value would in part be the product of H’s endeavours, not the parties’ joint endeavours and would therefore, in part, not be marital property. The weight to give H’s post-separation endeavour was part of the court’s discretion. The overall division which effected a fair outcome was an award that gave H 55 per cent of the capital wealth and W 45 per cent. There was no justification for dividing the non-share assets other than broadly equally, although the manner in which that was effected had to take into account their current needs (paras 138-143, 150-151). (5) An immediate clean break would not be fair. It would not allow W to meet her current income needs. H was able to pay maintenance as a result of his earned income. On the basis of his net income, he should pay W maintenance for herself of £100,000 annually. It was reasonable for the children’s trusts to be used for the payment of both school fees and maintenance, given the parties’ current financial position and the level of resources in the trusts (paras 160-162, 167).
Counsel: for the applicant: C Howard QC, R Castle; for the respondent: M Pointer QC, T Bishop QC
Solicitors: for the applicant: Hughes Fowler Carruthers; for the respondent: Alexiou Fisher Philipps
It was in a patient’s best interests to have life-sustaining treatment withheld where the treatment would be futile and extremely burdensome to endure, and he would never recover enough from multiple organ failure to leave hospital. The appellant hospital trust appealed against a judge’s refusal to make a declaration that it would be lawful for treatment for the first respondent patient (J) to be withheld in the event of a clinical deterioration.
In the context of the recovery by a landlord of service charges, the court considered the width and flexibility of the leasehold valuation tribunal’s jurisdiction under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s.20ZA(1) to dispense with the consultation requirements set out in the Service Charges (Consultation Requirements) (England) Regulations 2003 Sch.4 Pt 2, and the principles upon which that jurisdiction was to be exercised.
Where an authority like the Financial Services Authority, acting in pursuance of a public duty, sought an interim injunction, there was no general rule that it should be required to give a cross-undertaking in damages in respect of losses incurred by third parties
A consultation conducted before a local authority introduced a council tax reduction scheme was not rendered unfair and unlawful by the failure to give information about alternative funding possibilities, nor did announcement of a subsequent transitional grant scheme require further consultation